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Abstract
Among the most important and robust violations of rationality are the attrac-
tion and the compromise eﬀects. The compromise eﬀect refers to the tendency of
individuals to choose an intermediate option in a choice set, while the attraction
eﬀect refers to the tendency to choose an option that dominates some other op-
tions in the choice set. This paper argues that both eﬀects may result from an
individual’s attempt to overcome the diﬃculty of making a choice in the absence of
a single criterion for ranking the options. Moreover, we propose to view the resolu-
tion of this choice problem as a cooperative solution to an intra-personal bargaining
problem among diﬀerent selves of an individual, where each self represents a dif-
ferent criterion for choosing. We ﬁrst identify a set of properties that characterize
those choice correspondences that coincide with our bargaining solution, for some
pair of preference relations. Second, we provide a revealed-preference foundation to
our bargaining solution and characterize the extent to which these two preference
relations can be uniquely identiﬁed.
Alternatively, our analysis may be reinterpreted as a study of (inter-personal)
bilateral bargaining over a ﬁnite set of options. In that case, our results provide
a new characterization, as well as testable implications, of an ordinal bargaining
solution that has been previously discussed in the literature under the various names
of fallback bargaining, unanimity compromise, Rawlsian arbitration rule and Kant-
Rawls social compromise.
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11. INTRODUCTION
M a n yo ft h ed e c i s i o np r o b l e m sw ef a c ea r ec o m p l i c a t e db yt h ef a c tt h a tt h e r ei sn o
single dimension or criterion for evaluating the available alternatives. For example, when
searching for an apartment or a house, the ranking of the available options may be very
diﬀerent depending on whether the criterion we use is price, size, proximity to work or
quality of schools. Similarly, when choosing a car, there are several diﬀerent criteria or
dimensions that one may use such as price, safety, gas eﬃciency, size, color or esthetics.
Also, in deciding between academic job oﬀers there is no one obvious criterion to use as
o n em a yc o n s i d e rt h er a n k i n go ft h ed e p a r t m e n t ,t h en u m b e ro ff a c u l t ym e m b e r si no n e ’ s
ﬁeld, the ﬁnancial terms, the location, etc.. Often there can be many diﬀerent dimensions
or criteria that one may use, making it diﬃcult, if not impossible, to take all of them into
account. This often leads us to focus only on a limited number of dimensions, which we
deem most important. However, we are still faced with the diﬃcult task of resolving the
trade-oﬀ between these dimensions.
If we were fully rational, as is typically assumed in economics, then ﬁrst, we would
be able to take into account all possible dimensions, and second, we would be able to
consistenly make the necessary trade-oﬀs across dimensions. However, numerous studies
in economics, psychology and marketing provide overwhelming evidence that individuals
exhibit systematic departures from rational choice, especially in those situations where
there is no obvious single criterion for evaluating the available options. This suggests that
individuals often ﬁnd it diﬃcult to resolve the conﬂict about how much of one dimension
to trade oﬀ in favor of another, and hence, they resort to simple heuristics that lead to
systematic violations of rationality. Among the most studied and robust violations are
the attraction and the compromise eﬀects.
The attraction eﬀect was ﬁrst demonstrated by Huber, Payne and Puto (1982), while
the compromise eﬀect was introduced by Simonson (1989).1 The attraction eﬀect refers to
the ability of an asymmetrically dominated or relatively inferior alternative, when added
to a set, to increase the choice probability of the dominating alternative. The compromise
eﬀect refers to the ability of an “extreme” (but not inferior) alternative, when added to a
set, to increase the choice probability of an “intermediate” alternative. To illustrate these
two eﬀects, consider two options,  and  Suppose there are two dimensions or criteria
for evaluating these options such that  is better than  along the ﬁrst dimension while
1These studies have sprung a whole literature devoted to replicating and extending these eﬀects to
various decision problems, including real, monetary choices. For references see Shaﬁr, Simonson and
Tversky (1993), Kivetz, Netzer and Srinivasan (2004) and Ariely (2008).
2 is better than  along the second dimension (see Figure 1). For example, suppose 
and  are two equally priced apartments, but one is closer to work while the other has
better schools.
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In a typical experimental study (which uses a between-subjects design), both  and 
are chosen - usually in equal proportions - by a control group of subjects. The attraction
eﬀe c ti so b s e r v e dw h e nat h i r da l t e r n a t i v e , is added to the set such that it is dominated
by only one of the other two options (say,  as in Figure 1). When subjects are asked
to choose from {} t h ev a s tm a j o r i t yo ft h e mt e n dt oc h o o s e. The compromise
eﬀect occurs when  is added such that it is even better than  along the ﬁrst dimension
but worse than it along the second dimension (i.e., according to the ﬁrst dimension,  is
better than  which is better than  while the opposite ranking is obtained according
to the second dimension). In such a case, most subjects again tend to pick . These
ﬁndings may be interpreted as systematic violations of the Weak Axiom of Revealed
Preferences (WARP) by considering a choice correspondence that selects both  and 
from {} but chooses  alone from {}.2
The introduction of these two eﬀects has generated a huge literature in marketing
a i m e da tu n d e r s t a n d i n gt h es o u r c eo ft h ee ﬀects and their implications for positioning,
branding and advertising (see Kivetz, Netzer, and Srinivasan (2004)). One important
question that arises is whether the two eﬀects may be viewed as just “snapshots” of a more
general choice procedure, which may lead to more signiﬁcant violations of WARP across
various decision problems. This paper attempts to address this question by proposing and
characterizing a choice procedure that generates both the attraction and the compromise
eﬀects. Our choice procedure is motivated by the interpretation of these two eﬀects
2More speciﬁcally, this is a violation of the -axiom proposed by Sen (1971).
3as instances of “reason-based choice” (see Simonson (1989), Tversky and Shaﬁr (1992)
and Shaﬁr, Simonson and Tversky (1993)). According to this interpretation, in the
absence of a single criterion for ranking available options (what is often referred to as
“choice under conﬂict”), choices may be explained “in terms of the balance of reasons
for and against the various alternatives” (see Shaﬁr, Simonson and Tversky (1993)).3
To formalize this interpretation, we envision the decision-maker as trying to reach a
compromise between conﬂicting “inner selves”, representing the diﬀerent attributes or
dimensions of the available options. We then propose to view the ﬁnal choice (i.e., the
“balancing of reasons for and against”) as a cooperative solution to a bargaining among
the diﬀerent selves. In the spirit of the literature on dual-selves (e.g., the  −  models
of present bias, Benhabib and Bisin (2004), Eliaz and Spiegler (2006), Fudenberg and
Levine (2006)), we focus our analysis on decision problems that give rise to two selves.
We start by considering the two relevant criteria or dimensions, and their associated
rankings, as primitives of the model. This allows us to focus attention on how conﬂict
could be resolved in the mind of a decision maker who is subject to both the attraction
and compromise eﬀects, while still satisfying some consistency properties. Also, it may
be reasonable in some applications to consider that these primitives are indeed known to
the modeler. As illustration, one may think for instance of the choice of product with
two attributes such as price and quality, price and size, shipping rate and date of arrival,
sugar and fat content, etc. Formally, our ﬁrst model consists of a ﬁnite set of options
 and a pair of linear orderings on this set, Â=( Â1Â2). Each ordering is interpreted
as the (known) preference relation of one of the individual’s dual selves. A bargaining
problem is deﬁned to be a non-empty subset of options  For a given preference proﬁle
Â, a bargaining solution is a correspondence Â that associates with every bargaining
problem  as u b s e to f.
Which cooperative bargaining solution can capture our dual-self interpretation of
reason-based choice? This solution should ﬁrst of all exhibit properties that capture the
attraction and compromise eﬀects. We interpret an attraction eﬀect as the following
property (ATT): whenever a set of options is expanded by adding an alternative that is
Pareto dominated by some previously chosen element, then only those chosen alternatives
that dominate the new alternative are selected from the new set. We view a compromise
as an attempt to resolve conﬂicting preferences over a pair of alternatives by selecting an
outcome that is ranked in between the two by both bargainers. A bargaining solution,
therefore, exhibits a compromise eﬀect, or what we call the “No Better Compromise”
3Note that reasons involving relationships to other alternatives may lead to violations of WARP.
4property (NBC), if whenever  and  are chosen from a set, then there cannot be an
element in that set that both bargainers rank between  and .
Our ﬁrst main result (Theorem 1) establishes the existence of a unique bargaining
solution that satisﬁes the above properties, in addition to a number of other properties
that capture a notion of consistency across decision problems, the cooperative nature of
the bargaining, immunity to framing and symmetry. To describe this solution, imagine
that for every bargaining problem, each bargainer assigns each option a score equal to the
number of elements in its lower contour set. Hence, each option is associated with a pair of
scores. The bargaining solution selects the op t i o n sw h o s em i n i m a ls c o r ei sh i g h e s t .T h i s
solution has been previously discussed in the literature under various names: “Rawlsian
arbitration rule” (Sprumont (1993)), “Kant-Rawls Social Compromise” (Hurwicz and
Sertel (1997)), “fallback bargaining” (Brams and Kilgour (2001)), as well as “unanimity
compromise” (Kibris and Sertel (2007)). An appealing feature of this bargaining solution
is that it is purely ordinal and applies to any arbitrary ﬁnite set of options (in contrast
to the Nash or Kalai-Smordinsky solutions).4
Next we consider an environment in which there is no obvious way to rank the options
along two dimensions. We interpret our focus on only two dimensions as an assumption
that the decision-maker can process only a limited number of dimensions or attributes.
Thus, if the options are characterized by a large number of attributes, it may not be clear
which two dimensions the decision-maker focuses on. Hence, an outside observer may not
be able to infer what rankings the decision-maker uses to evaluate the options. Alterna-
tively, there may be only two salient dimensions or attributes, but it is not obvious how
a decision-maker would rank the options along each dimension (consider, for example,
attributes such as color, taste, smell). In such an environment the only observations we
may have about the decision-maker are the choices he makes (i.e., his choice correspon-
dence). We ask the following question: what are the necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for representing the decision-maker as if he has two selves (each characterized by a linear
ordering on ), which make a choice according to the fallback bargaining solution?
Our second main result (Theorem 2) identiﬁes these conditions. This result relies on
the notions of “revealed Pareto dominance” and “revealed compromises”. An option 
is revealed to be Pareto superior to  if it is chosen over  in a pairwise comparison. An
option  is revealed to be a compromise between  and  if no option in this triplet is
revealed to be Pareto superior over another, and  is chosen uniquely from {}.T h e
4Mariotti (1998) proposes an extension of the Nash bargaining solution to ﬁnite environments. How-
ever the extended solution still uses cardinal information as it is deﬁned over sets of payoﬀ vectors.
5necessary and suﬃcient conditions identiﬁed in Theorem 2 include the revealed versions
of the relevant properties characterized in Theorem 1, in addition to properties that
capture the consistency of the revealed Pareto relation and the consistency of revealed
compromises.
Because we need to simultaneously recover two preference relations, proving Theorem
2r e q u i r e sad i ﬀerent approach than the one that is typically used in the choice theoretic
literature. The diﬃculty arises when we observe that both  and  were chosen from
{} and that both  and  were chosen from {}. These choices reveal to us that
the two selves disagree on the rankings of {} and {}. The challenge we face is to
determine whether the self who ranks  above  also ranks  above 5 We overcome this
diﬃculty by constructing an induction argument in which the elements of  are added
in a particular order. In particular, we partition the set of options into “revealed Pareto
layers”, and the elements in each Pareto layer are further partitioned into “revealed
extreme layers” (where the most extreme layer includes elements that are never revealed
to be compromises in that Pareto layer).
This reﬁned induction proves useful, not only in deﬁning the selves’ orderings and
showing that they are transitive, but also in addressing the question of “identiﬁability”:
to what extent can we identify the set of preference proﬁles that are compatible with
the observed choices? Clearly, exchanging the rankings between the two selves does not
aﬀect the bargaining solution. Theorem 3 argues that there is a sense in which any further
multiplicity is with respect to “irrelevant alternatives”. This means that for any given
bargaining problem , we can pin down the pair of preferences over the minimal set of
options that Pareto dominate any option outside this set.
So far, we have interpreted our choice procedure as a solution to an intra-personal
bargaining problem. Alternatively, we may interpret it as a solution to an inter-personal
bargaining problem where two distinct individuals need to agree on an option. While
most of the choice theoretic literature aims to characterize testable implications of mod-
els of individual decision-making, the same set of tools may be applied to models of
collective decision-making. Since many collective decisions are achieved through bargain-
ing, it seems important to identify the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for inferring
the bargainers’ preferences and for modelling their decisions as an outcome of coopera-
tive bargaining. This paper takes a ﬁrst step in this direction by studying situations in
5Note that this diﬃculty does not arise in establishing the revealed-preference foundation of non-
cooperative solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium (Sprumont (2000)). There, we can isolate the
preference relation of each player by ﬁxing the action of the opponent.
6which two individuals bargain over some ﬁnite, arbitrary set of alternatives. We, there-
fore, focuses on ordinal bargaining solutions on ﬁnite domains. Among such solutions,
the fallback bargaining solution has received much attention in the literature. Moreoever,
this solution has a non-cooperative foundation, which is similar to the real-life bargaining
protocol, that the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) recommends to
disputing parties.6 Theorem 2 and 3 then provide testable implications of the fallback so-
lution and characterize the extent to which the bargainers’ preferences may be recovered
from the data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The related literature is discussed in
the next section. Section 3 deﬁnes the basic concepts and notations. This is followed by
an axiomatic characterization of the fallback solution for known preferences in Section 4
The revealed-preference analysis of this solution is presented in Section 5 Finally, Section
6 discusses possible extensions and provides some concluding remarks.
2. RELATION TO THE LITERATURE
In relation to the literature, our paper makes the following contributions. First,
we propose a single model that “explains” both the attraction and the compromise ef-
fects and characterize its testable implications. Second, we provide a revealed-preference
foundation for a dual-self model in which the selves strive to reach compromise rather
than to behave non-cooperatively. Third, our axiomatic characterization also provides
a revealed-preference foundation for a cooperative bargaining solution. To better assess
these contributions, we discuss below some of the related papers in the literature.
Explaining attraction and compromise
A number of recent papers have proposed formal models that explain either the attrac-
tion eﬀect or the compromise eﬀect. However, there is no single model in this literature
that generates both eﬀects in a single-person decision problem (such as those encountered
in the experiments that document these eﬀects). Ok, Ortoleva and Riella (2008) relax the
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences to allow for choice behavior that exhibits the at-
traction eﬀect, but not the compromise eﬀect. They propose a reference-dependent choice
model in which given a choice problem  the decision-maker maximizes a real function 
6See Section 1404.12, "Selection by Parties and Appointments of Arbitrators" in
http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=197&itemID=16959
7over those options that Pareto dominate a reference point () a c c o r d i n gt oas e q u e n c e
of utility functions u. This choice procedure may be interpreted as a bargaining problem
with a continuum of bargainers and a disagreement point () where the solution max-
imizes a social welfare function (SWF)  over the set of options that are “individually
rational”. The authors characterize necessary and suﬃcient conditions on choice data
to be consistent with some bargaining model (u). One of these conditions, labeled
“reference-dependent WARP”, rules out the compromise eﬀect.7
Kivetz, Netzer and Srinivasan (2004) argue that individuals may exhibit the compro-
mise eﬀect when choosing among multi-attribute options because of the rule they use to
aggregate the diﬀerent subjective values they assign to the attributes. The authors pro-
pose several functional forms of aggregation rules that can generate the compromise eﬀect
- but not the attraction eﬀect - and test the predictions of these functions on experimental
data.
Kamenica (2008) argues that in a monopolistic market with enough uninformed but
rational consumers, there are some conditions that guarantee the existence of equilibria
in which the uninformed consumers exhibit the compromise eﬀect, or the attraction
eﬀect, with positive probability. While this argument suggests one interpretation of why
consumers in a market may exhibit compromise/attraction-like behavior, there are some
caveats in adopting this argument as the explanation of the attraction and compromise
eﬀect. First, Kamenica (2008) studies a signalling game, which like all signalling games
has multiple equilibria. The equilibria of interest that the paper identiﬁes are only those
t h a ts u r v i v ew h a ti sk n o w na st h eD 1c r i t e r i o n . 8 Second, there are many instances - such
as the numerous experiments that document the compromise and attraction eﬀects - in
which individuals consistently exhibit these eﬀects outside the market when they are not
engaged in a non-cooperative game against some seller.
Rationalization by multiple rationales
A number of recent papers have proposed to model systematic violations of IIA as the
result of a choice procedure that, in contrast to rational choice, takes as input multiple
orderings (“rationales”) on the set of alternatives. One set of works in this literature is
7To see this, recall that the compromise eﬀect means that whenever the choice out of any pair in
{} is the pair itself, then only a single element will be chosen from the triplet. Suppose  is
chosen. If the choice correspondence satisﬁes “reference-dependent WARP” then either  or  act as a
“potential reference point” for  meaning that  must be chosen uniquely from {} or from {},a
contradiction.
8In addition, the existence of these equilibria require assumptions on both the seller and the consumers.
8not concerned with deriving testable implications and focuses on a diﬀerent set of ques-
tions than we do. Kalai, Rubinstein and Spiegler (2002) ask what is the minimal number
of preference relations on a set of elements, , such that the single choice from any subset
 ⊆  is the maximal element in  according to at least one of these relations. Ambrus
and Rosen (2008) are concerned with the minimal number of utility functions that are
needed to explain a choice function as the maximization of a cardinal SWF that aggre-
gates these utilities. Green and Hojman (2007) propose a welfare criterion for evaluating
irrational choices, by modeling these choices as reﬂecting a weighted aggregation of all
possible strict orderings on the set of options.
Another set of papers in this literature does attempt to provide a revealed-preference
characterization to decision heuristics that use multiple rationales. Manzini and Mariotti
(2007) study a "shortlisting" procedure according to which a decision-maker sequentially
applies two binary relations, 1 and 2, such that the ultimate choice from a set  is
the 2-maximal element from among the 1-maximal elements in  (see also Manzini
and Mariotti (2008)). Cherepanov, Feddersen and Sandroni (2008) propose a model in
which a decision-maker is characterized by two primitives: a single, complete preference
relation and a set of asymmetric, binary (possibly incomplete) relations. Given a set of
options , the decision-maker picks his most preferred option from among the elements
in  that are maximal according to each of the rationales. These papers all focus on
single-valued choice rules that violate IIA. In contrast, one of the key properties of our
choice rule, RA, reduces to IIA when the choice rule is required to be single-valued.
Testable implications of collective decision-making
Finally, our paper is related to a small but growing literature that aims to pro-
vide testable implications for models of collective decision-making. Among those papers
that employ a revealed-preference methodology, the most closely related are Sprumont
(2000) and Eliaz, Richter and Rubinstein (2009). The former provides a choice theoretic
characterization of Nash equilibrium and the Pareto correspondence, while the latter
characterizes the choice correspondence that selects the top element(s) of two preference
orderings.
A number of other papers explore similar questions but without employing a revealed-
preference methodology. Chiappori (1988) characterizes the conditions under which it is
possible to recover the preferences and decision process of two individuals, who con-
sume leisure and some Hicksian composite good, from observations on their labor supply
9functions. Chiappori and Ekeland (2006) extend this analysis and characterize the nec-
essary and suﬃcient conditions for recovering the individual preferences of a group of
individuals from observations on their aggregate consumption and the common budget
constraint that they face. Chiappori and Donni (2005) analyze the testable implications
of the Nash bargaining solution in an environment where two individuals need to agree
on the allocation of a pie among themselves and where disagreement leads each to receive
some reservation payment. In a similar vein, Chambers and Echenique (2008) study the
testable implications of the standard model of two-sided markets with transfers and char-
acterize the sets of matchings that may be generated by the model.
3. DEFINITIONS
 will denote the ﬁnite set of all potential options. A bargaining problem is a subset of
.Abargaining solution  associates to each bargaining problem  a nonempty subset
() of . A (strict) linear ordering on  is a relation deﬁned on × that is complete,
transitive, and anti-reﬂexive. The set of all possible linear orderings is denoted ().A
preference-based bargaining solution is a function9  that associates a bargaining solution
Â to each pair Â=( Â1Â2) of linear orderings on .
Let Â=( Â1Â2) ∈ ()×(),a n dl e t be a bargaining problem. The score of 
in  along dimension  ( =1or 2) is the number of feasible options that are (strictly)
worse than  for Â:
(Â)=|{ ∈ | Â }|
The fallback bargaining solution 

Â associated to Â associates to each bargaining problem
 the set of options in  that maximize the minimum (over  =1 2) of the scores:


Â()=a r gm a x
∈
min
=12
(Â)
The resulting preference-based bargaining solution will be denoted by .
As pointed out in the introduction, the fallback bargaining solution has already ap-
peared under various names in the literature on interpersonal bargaining (Sprumont
(1993), Hurwicz and Sertel (1997), Brams and Kilgour (2001), Kibris and Sertel (2007)).
The terminology of “fallback bargaining” is taken from Brams and Kilgour (2001), where
they oﬀer a nice reinterpretation of the solution. For each bargaining problem ,a n d
9For notational convenience, we use the same letter, , to denote both a bargaining solution and a
preference-based bargaining solution. The context will always make it clear what the right meaning is.
10each integer between 1 and ||,l e t() be the set of  best options in  according
to ’s preferences. Let ∗ be the smallest  such that 1() ∩ 2() 6= ∅.T h e n
Σ

Â()=1(∗) ∩ 2(∗).
In other words, if both criteria agree on what the best option is, then it is the solution.
Otherwise, the decision-maker looks for option(s) that would be ranked either top or
second-best by both criteria. If no option satisﬁes this property, then the decision-maker
iterates the procedure by allowing for third-best alternatives, and so on so forth. This
simple algorithm for deriving the elements in the solution illustrates the appeal of the
fallback solution as a descriptive model of multi-criteria decision making.
Figure 2 illustrates how the fallback solution generates the attraction and compromise
eﬀects.
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In both cases, both  and  would get a minimal score of 0 if  was not available.
Adding  changes the scores, and  now gets the largest minimal score in both cases. It
thus becomes selected uniquely by the fallback solution.
It is also interesting to note that in the spirit of the Nash program, fallback bargaining
has a non-cooperative foundation. The two bargainers alternate in proposing one of the
available options as a possible agreement. If the responder accepts, the game ends and
the proposed option is adopted. If the responder rejects, the proposed option is removed
from the set, and the responder now proposes one of the remaining options. The game
continues until either an agreement is reached or there remains only a single option,
which is then adopted. Anbarci (1993, 2006) shows that the unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium of this game is an element in 

Â()10
10Interestingly, Anbarci (1993) also shows that the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome also converges
11The fallback solution applies an egalitarian criterion to a canonical representation of
the ordinal preferences. It is interesting to think about applying a utilitarian criterion
instead. The resulting solution would then be the analogue in our context to the rule that
Borda deﬁned in the eighteenth century to select representatives. However, this solution
has two important shortcomings. First, it selects all the elements of  whenever they
are all Pareto optimal for the pair of orderings (Â1Â2), and hence does not capture the
compromise eﬀect. Second, in contrast to the fallback solution, the Borda rule is not
robust to common monotonic transformations of the bargainers’ ordinal preferences in
the sense that it is sensitive to how the score of an option changes as it moves up in the
ranking (cf. “scoring rules”).
4. PREFERENCE-BASED AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATION
The aim of this section is to establish that fallback bargaining is the unique preference-
based bargaining solution that captures a number of desiderata. First, it should exhibit
properties that capture a plausible interpretation of attraction and compromise. Second,
we should be able to interpret the solution as a “procedurally-rational” heuristic. Thus,
the solution should exhibit some form of consistency across decision/bargaining problems.
Third, the solution should capture our idea that the bargaining among the selves is in
some sense “cooperative”. Finally, we wish to interpret all the options selected by the
solution (i.e., any “agreement” reached by the two selves) as being on “equal footing” in
terms of their desirability and robusteness to small changes in the bargaining prolem.
W ef o c u so u ra t t e n t i o no nac l a s so fp r e f e r e n c e-based bargaining solutions, which sat-
isfy some basic properties from axiomatic bargaining and social choice. This would allow
us to meaningfully interpret the correspondence Â as a bargaining solution. Speciﬁcally,
a preference-based bargaining solution is regular if
1. it is neutral in the sense of not having an a priori bias in favor or against some
elements of .L e t  :  →  be an isomorphism. Then (Â)(()) = Â(),
where ()={()| ∈ } and (Â) ∈ () × () is such that (Â) if and
only if −1() Â −1(),f o ra l l ∈  and both  ∈ {12}.
2. it treats both orderings with equal relevance: (Â2Â1)()=(Â1Â2)().
to the Area Monotonic Solution if the alternatives are uniformly distributed over the bargaining set, and
as the number of alternatives tends to inﬁnity.
123. options are selected using only the parts of the two orderings that are relevant to
the problem. If Â0 is an alternative pair of linear orderings (deﬁned on )t h a t
coincide with Â on  × ,t h e nÂ0()=Â().11
It is certainly of interest to investigate how our theory would adapt if one eliminates
some or all of these properties. Dropping neutrality would allow to accomodate some
framing eﬀects, where the label of the available options may inﬂuence the choice (e.g.
options are presented in a list, or are oﬀered by trademarks with varying impact, etc.).
Dropping the second property would add the possibility of having one of the two criteria
as being more relevant than the other (e.g. caring more about the size of the car than
its color). Dropping the third property would allow to consider choice procedures where
the decision maker is inﬂuenced by options he aspires to, but cannot aﬀord. Yet, we
believe that one must ﬁrst understand the attraction and compromise eﬀects in their
purest form, in absence of all these additional features. The regularity property thus
deﬁnes a benchmark which can be used to build more elaborate theories.
The following axioms are imposed on a regular preference-based bargaining solution
, and will be assumed to be valid for each Â∈ () × (),a n de a c h ⊆ .
Attraction (ATT) - Let  ∈  \  be such that  Â ,f o rs o m e ∈ Â().T h e n
Â( ∪ {})={ ∈ Â()| Â }.12
ATT formalizes the idea that adding a dominated alternative reinforces the appeal of
an option to the decision maker. This property is best understood by decomposing it into
two parts. First, whenever option  is added to a set  it seems reasonable to expect that
the set of options that were previously selected, and which dominate  should continue
to be chosen, i.e., { ∈ Â()| Â } ⊆ Â(∪{}) We view the attraction eﬀect as the
converse inclusion, Â( ∪ {}) ⊆ { ∈ Â()| Â } i.e., when choosing from the new
set, one’s attention is drawn to the previously selected options that dominate .T h u s ,
the solution to the enlarged problem obtained by adding  as a feasible option should be
the intersection of the solution to the original problem with those options that Pareto
dominate  whenever that set is nonempty.13
11Similar properties have been used repeatedly in the classical theories of bargaining and social choice
(ﬁrst mentioned explicitly in Karni and Schmeidler (1975)).
12Â refers to the Pareto relation (incomplete ordering on  ×) when comparing options, i.e.  Â 
means  Â1  and  Â2 . On the other hand, the symbol Â in Â refers to the pair (Â1Â2) of linear
orderings on .W e d o n o t i n t r o d u c e d i ﬀerent symbols because the right meaning is always obvious
when used in context.
13One could argue that the added element  may also increase the appeal of some options that were
chosen in , but do not Pareto dominate , because of the compromise eﬀect. Thus, one may feel
13No Better Compromise (NBC) - If both  and  belong to Â(), then there does not
exist  ∈  and  ∈ {12} such that  Â  Â  and  Â−  Â− .
NBC captures the idea that the bargainers are trying to reach a compromise. If two
bargainers were not able to agree on a single option - so that both  and  are identiﬁed
as possible agreements - then it must be that there was no option  a v a i l a b l et h a tc o u l d
serve as a compromise between  and . By this we mean that there was no alternative
 that falls “in between”  and ,i nt h a ti ti sb e t t e rt h a n along the dimension where
it is worse that , and better than  along the dimension where it is worse than .14
Removing an Alternative (RA) - If Â() 6= {},t h e nÂ( \{ }) ∩ Â() 6= ∅.
RA captures the sense in which the bargaining solution may be interpreted as a
procedurally-rational heuristic. Since both ATT and NBC are typically incompatible
with WARP, we propose a weaker consistency property. If an option (that is not the
u n i q u ec h o i c eo ft h ed e c i s i o nm a k e r )i sd r o p p e d ,t h e na tl e a s to n eo ft h eo p t i o n st h a tw e r e
chosen in the original problem belongs to the solution of the reduced problem. Observe
that RA is equivalent to IIA if the bargaining solution is single-valued, as RA can be
applied iteratively if one needs to eliminate multiple irrelevant alternatives. Yet, moving
to correspondences, the slight diﬀerence between the two properties when eliminating a
single alternative can lead to major diﬀerences in terms of choices. In addition, RA also
expresses some form of continuity in our discrete setting. Indeed, making a small change
in the set of available options (i.e. dropping only one alternative) should not modify too
much the set of selected elements (i.e. nonempty intersection) whenever this set is not a
singleton.
Eﬃciency (EFF) - If  ∈ Â(), then there does not exist  ∈  such that  Â .
EFF captures the cooperative nature of the bargaining. It is also a standard property
in axiomatic bargaining and social choice.
that imposing ATT is unduly restrictive, as it presumes that the attraction eﬀect is more relevant than
the compromise eﬀects in those conﬁgurations. It turns out that both our characterization results (see
Theorems 1 and 2 below) remain valid when ATT is weakened so as to apply only when those elements
that were selected in  but do not Pareto dominate  do not fall in between  and another alternative
of .
14Note that since we are using only ordinal information, any element  such that  Â  Â  and  Â
 Â  is interpreted a “compromise”, regardless of how it is ranked relative to other elements that are
ranked in between  and . One may question this interpretation if, for example,  Â  Â  Â  Â 
and  Â  Â  Â  Â  In this case it may seem less reasonable to consider  a compromise between
 and  s i n c ei ns o m es e n s e ,i ti s“ c l o s e r ”t o than to . We return to this point in the concluding
section, where we discuss possible extensions.
14Symmetry (SYM) - If  ∈ Â() and there exists  ∈  \{ } such that  6∈
Â( \{ }),t h e nt h e r ee x i s t s0 ∈  \{ } such that  6∈ Â( \{ 0}).
SYM formalizes a sense in which all the options selected by the solution are of equal
“status”. Suppose  and  are both in the solution. Imagine that one of the bargainers
makes the following argument against the inclusion of :“  is not selected when the
option  is removed from the table; but since we did not choose  we may consider it oﬀ
the table, hence, we should not select ”. Such an argument would not be convincing if
the other bargainer could counter by observing that a similar claim can be made against
 : if we remove 0 which was not chosen, then  will no longer be selected. Observe that
SYM is vacuous if the choice method is rational, but it does place a nontrivial restriction
on irrational procedures. However, this property is satisﬁed by some well-known social
welfare functions such as the Borda rule mentioned above.
Our main result in this section relies on the following inductive characterization of
the fallback bargaining solution (we relegate its proof to the Appendix).
Lemma 1 Let Â∈ () × (),a n dl e t be a bargaining problem with at least four
elements. Then,
1. 

Â()={} if and only if
(a)  ∈ 

Â( \{ }),f o re a c h ∈  \{ },a n d
(b) for each  ∈  \{ },t h e r ee x i s t s ∈  \{ } such that  6∈ 

Â( \{ }).
2. 

Â()={} if and only if
(a) 

Â( \{ }) ⊆ {},f o re a c h ∈ ,a n d
(b) there exists  ∈  \{ } such that 

Â( \{ })={} if and only if there
exists 0 ∈  \{ } such that 

Â( \{ 0})={}.
In addition, if 

Â()={},a n d

Â( \{})={}, for all  ∈  \{},t h e n
 Â  and  Â , for all  ∈ \{}.A l s o ,i f

Â()={}, 

Â(\{})={},a n d


Â(\{})={}, then there exists  ∈ {12} such that  Â  Â  and  Â−  Â− .
Theorem 1  is the only regular preference-based bargaining solution that satisﬁes
EFF, ATT, NBC, RA, and SYM.
15Proof:W eﬁrst check that  satisﬁes the axioms. EFF and regularity follow im-
mediately from the deﬁnition. RA and SYM follow from Lemma 1. As for ATT, ob-
serve that min=12 ( ∪ {}Â)=m i n =12 (Â)+1 ,f o re a c h ∈ 

Â() such
that  Â , while the minimal score of any other option cannot increase by more than
one point. Hence any such  must belong to 

Â( ∪ {}), and any option that was
not selected for  does not belong to 

Â( ∪ {}). Now we only have to show that
 6∈ 

Â( ∪ {}) when 

Â()={},  Â  and  ¨ .T oﬁx the notation, suppose
that argmin=12 (Â)=1and argmin=12 (Â)=2 . Hence  Â1 ,a n dt r a n -
sitivity implies that  Â1 . In turn, this implies that  Â2 .T h e m i n i m a ls c o r e o f
thus remains constant when adding ,a n d 6∈ 

Â( ∪ {}). Finally for NBC, suppose
that 

Â()={} and that there exists  ∈  such that  Â  Â  and  Â−  Â− .
Hence it must be that the minimal score for  is reached along dimension , and it is
equal to the minimal score of  that is reached along dimension −. On the other hand, 
scores at least one additional point than  (resp. ) along dimension  (resp. −). Hence
a contradiction with the fact that  and  have the largest minimal score among all the
elements of .
We now move to the more diﬃcult part of the proof, showing the necessary condition.
Let thus  be a preference-based bargaining solution that satisﬁes the eight axioms. We
prove that  =  in two main steps.
Step 1 Let  be a preference-based bargaining solution that satisﬁes ATT, NBC, RA,
EFF, and SYM, and let Â∈ () × ().I fÂ()=

Â(), for all  ⊆  with two
or three elements, then Â()=

Â(),f o ra l l ⊆ .
We prove that Â()=

Â(),f o ra l l ⊆ , by induction on the number of elements
in . By assumption, the result is true when || =2or 3.W e a s s u m e n o w t h a t t h e
result holds for any subset of  with at most −1 elements, and we choose a set  with
exactly  elements ( ≥ 4). We have to prove that Â()=

Â().
F i r s tw eo b s e r v et h a tÂ() has at most two elements. Suppose on the contrary that
 ∈ Â(). EFF implies that there is no Pareto comparison between any pair of
elements in {}. Hence one of these three options must fall “in between” the other
two, leading to a contradiction with NBC.
Suppose now that 

Â()={},f o rs o m e ∈ . Lemma 1 and the induction
hypothesis imply that Â( \{})=

Â( \{}) ⊆ {},f o re a c h ∈ .N o t i c et h a t
Â() cannot include an element diﬀerent from  and . Indeed, #() ≤ 2 would then
imply that Â()={}, {}, {},o r{0},f o rs o m e0 ∈  \{ },a n dR A
16would lead to a contradiction with Â( \{}) ⊆ {}, for all  ∈ . So we’ll be done
after proving that Â() is equal to neither {},n o r{}. Suppose on the contrary that
Â()={} (a similar reasoning applies for ). RA implies that  ∈ Â(\{}), for all
 ∈  \{}. If there exists  ∈  \{} such that  6∈ Â( \{}),t h e n

Â( \{})=
Â( \{ })={}. Lemma 1 and the induction hypothesis imply that there exists
0 ∈  \{ } such that Â( \{ 0})=

Â( \{ 0})={}, a contradiction with the
fact that  ∈ Â(\{0}). We must conclude that 

Â(\{})=Â(\{})={},
for all  ∈  \{ }. The penultimate statement of Lemma 1 implies that  Â 
and  Â , for all  ∈  \{ },o rÂ({})={} and Â({})={} since
Â = 

Â on pairs. We also have Â({})=

Â({})={}, and applying ATT
iteratively (adding elements of \{} one at a time), we conclude that Â()={},
contradicting the original assumption that Â()={}.
To conclude the proof of Step 1, suppose that 

Â()={},f o rs o m e ∈ .I f
Â()={},f o rs o m e 6= ,t h e n ∈ Â( \{ }), for all  ∈  \{ },b yR A .
This leads to a contradiction with Lemma 1, since there must exist  ∈  \{ } such
that  6∈ 

Â( \{ })=Â( \{ }).I ti sa l s oi m p o s s i b l et oh a v eÂ()={},f o r
some  diﬀerent from . Indeed, RA aplied to both Â and 

Â would then imply that


Â({\{})={},a n d

Â({\{})={}. The last statement of Lemma 1 implies
that there exists  ∈ {12} such that  Â  Â  and  Â−  Â− , a contradiction
with NBC. Suppose now that Â()={},f o rs o m e diﬀerent from .L e m m a 1
implies that there exists  ∈  \{ } such that  6∈ 

Â( \{ })=Â( \{ }).S Y M
implies that there exists 0 ∈  \{} such that  6∈ Â( \{0})=

Â( \{0}),w h i c h
is impossible. Hence Â()={}, as desired. This concludes the proof of Step 1.
Step 2 Let  be a preference-based bargaining solution that satisﬁes ATT, NBC, RA,
EFF, NEUT, EX, and IPUA. Then Â()=

Â() for all  ⊆  with two or three
elements, and all Â∈ () × ().
Let Â∈ () × (). Suppose ﬁrst  = {}.I f Â ,t h e n

Â()={}.S i n c e
Â({})={}, ATT implies that Â()={} as well, as desired. A similar reasoning
applies if  Â .I f Â1  and  Â2 ,t h e n

Â()={}. Suppose, on the other hand,
that Â()={}.L e t :  →  be the isomorphism deﬁned by ()=, ()=,
and ()=, for all  ∈  \{ }. NEUT implies that (Â)(()) = {}.N o t i c e
though that ()=,a n d(Â) equals (Â2Â1) when restricted to .E X a n d I P U A
then imply that Â()={}, a contradiction. Similarly, Â()={} w o u l dl e a dt o
17a contradiction, and we conclude that Â()={}, as desired. A similar reasoning
applies if  Â1  and  Â2 .
Let now  = {}. If one of the elements, let’s say  Pareto dominates the other
two, then 

Â()={} = Â(), by EFF. If two elements, let’s say  and  are not Pareto
dominates, but both Pareto dominate the third one, then 

Â()={}. The previous
paragraph implies that Â({})={},a n dA T Ti m p l i e st h a tÂ()={},a s
desired. If two pairs of elements are not Pareto comparable, let’s say () and (),
but the third one is, let’s say  Â ,t h e n

Â()={}. The previous paragraph
implies that Â({})={}, Â({})={},a n dÂ({})={}.A T T
implies that Â()={} as well, as desired. Remains the last case, where there is no
Pareto comparison out of any pair in , let’s say  Â1  Â1  and  Â2  Â2 .T h e n


Â()={}. We already proved in Step 1 that Â() contains at most two elements. If
cannot be {}, because of NBC. If that Â()={}, then consider the isomorphism
 :  →  deﬁned by ()=, ()=,a n d()=, for all  ∈  \{ }.
NEUT implies that (Â)(()) = {}. Notice though that ()=,a n d(Â)
equals (Â2Â1) when restricted to . EX and IPUA then imply that Â()={},a
contradiction. A similar argument shows that it is impossible to have Â()={},
{},o r{}. Hence Â()={}. This concludes the proof of Step 2, and hence the
proof of the theorem. ¥
Both Sprumont (1993) and Kibris and Sertel (2007) have already provided some ax-
iomatic characterizations of the fallback solution in an inter-personal bargaining context.
The main axioms in these previous papers restrict the behavior of the solution across prob-
lems that diﬀer in the bargainers’ preferences. These axioms thus become meaningless
when preferences are unknown. In contrast, our axioms impose restrictions on how the
composition of the solution varies across diﬀerent bargaining problems. As we show in
the next section, these axioms can be adapted to a setting in which preferences are not
observable.
We now prove the independence of the axioms appearing in Theorem 1.
EFF: Consider a set  with four elements, let’s say  = {},a n dl e t be the
preference-based bargaining solution that coincides with , except as follows: Â()=


Â()∪{}, for all  ∈  and all Â∈ ()×() such that Â1 and Â2 are completely
opposite on  \{},a n d is Pareto dominated by either the Â1-optimal element or the
Â2-optimal element, but by no other element of . For instance, Â∗()={},
while 

Â∗()={},w h e n Â∗
1  Â∗
1  Â∗
1  and  Â∗
2  Â∗
2  Â∗
2 .T h em o d i ﬁcation
thus amounts to add some options to the fallback solution in some cases, and will satisfy
18RA af o r t i o r i .B yc o n s t r u c t i o n , is regular, but violates EFF. ATT does not apply in
those cases where  is diﬀerent from  (because the Pareto dominated option falls below
an option that is not chosen in the triplet obtained by deleting that Pareto dominated
option), and hence  satisﬁes it (since  does). It is straightfoward to check NBC.
Finally, SYM is satisﬁed because  satisﬁes it, and a Pareto dominated option is never
selected out of any triplet.
ATT: Consider the fallback solution applied only to the set of Pareto eﬃcient alternatives,
Â()=

Â[Â()],w h e r e
Â()={ ∈  | for all  ∈ ,  Â  for some  ∈ {12}} (1)
Note that the fallback solution is applied here to a subset of options, whose score is
unaﬀected by dominated elements. Hence, Â violates ATT. It is straightforward to
verify that Â is regular and satisﬁes NBC, RA, EFF, EX and IPUA. To see that it also
satisﬁes SYM, suppose  ∈ Â() but  ∈ Â(\{}) for some  ∈ \{}.T h e n
 ∈ Â().L e t  ≡ Â() then  ∈ 

Â() but  ∈ 

Â(\{}) for some
 ∈ \{}.T h e nb yS Y M , ∈ 

Â(\{0}) for some 0 ∈ \{}, which implies that
 ∈ Â(\{0}).
NBC: Consider the analogue of the Borda rule in our setting:
Â()=a r gm a x
∈
[1(Â)+2(Â)]
for each subset  of . It is straightforward to check that this deﬁnes a regular preference-
based bargaining solution that satisﬁes EFF and ATT. It violates NBC. For instance, it
does not reﬁne the set of Pareto eﬃcient options when the two preferences are strict
opposite to each others. It remains to show that the solution satisﬁes both RA and
SYM. Since it satisﬁe sE F F ,t h es u mo ft h es c o r e sm u s td e c r e a s eb ya tl e a s to n ep o i n tf o r
each option that is chosen, when removing  from the original problem . Any element
of Â() such that the sum of the scores decreases by exactly one point when removing
 clearly belongs to Â( \{ }). Hence we must consider the case where the sum of
the scores decreases by two points, for each element of Â(). T h i si m p l i e st h a t is
Pareto dominated by some elements of , and the set of Pareto eﬃcient options remains
unchanged when removing . The sum of the scores of any element of the Pareto frontier
decreases by at least one point when removing , and hence Â() ⊆ Â(\{}),a n dw e
are done proving RA. For SYM, suppose on the contrary that one can ﬁnd  ∈ Â()
19and  ∈  \{ } such that  6∈ Â( \{ }) and  ∈ Â( \{ }).B o t h  and 
b e i n gP a r e t oe ﬃcient in ,i tm u s tb et h a tt h es u mo ft h es c o r e sd e c r e a s e sb ya tl e a s t
one point for both of them when removing .S i n c e remains chosen, but not ,i tm u s t
be that the sum of the scores of  decreases by two points while the sum of the scores
of  decreases by exactly one point. In other words,  Pareto dominates , but  does
not Pareto dominates . It is easy to check that one would get a contradiction with
 ∈ Â() i ft h e r ed o e sn o te x i s t0 ∈  that is Pareto dominated by , but not by .
For any such 0,w e ’ l lh a v e 6∈ Â( \{ 0}),a n dw ea r ed o n ep r o v i n gS Y M .
RA:L e t be the lexicographic reﬁnement of the fallback solution,


Â()={ ∈ 

Â() | (Â) ≥ (Â) ∀ ∈ 

Â()}
for each  ⊆ ,a m de a c hÂ∈ () × ().I t i s e a s y t o c h e c k t h a t  inherits
the properties of regularity, EFF, ATT, and NBC from . To see that it violates RA,
consider  = {} and the preference pair Â∗ that give rise to the following rank-
ing on :  Â∗
1  Â∗
1  Â∗
1  and  Â∗
2  Â∗
2  Â∗
2 .T h e n 

Â∗()={} while


Â∗(\{})={}. All what remains is to check SYM. Suppose that  ∈ 

Â()
and that there exists  ∈  \{ } such that  6∈ 

Â( \{ }). T h i si m p l i e st h a t
 ∈ 

Â().I ft h e r ee x i s t s ∈  \{ } such that  6∈ 

Â( \{ }), then there exists
0 ∈ \{} such that  6∈ 

Â(\{0}),b yS Y M .I ft h e r ee x i s t s0 ∈ \{} such that
 6∈ 

Â(\{0}),t h e n 6∈ 

Â(\{0}), as desired, since  reﬁnes . Hence the last
case that could lead to a possible violation of SYM for  is when  ∈ ( \{ }),
for all  ∈ \{}. But we know from Lemma 1 that this conﬁguration of choice for 
is possible only if  Â  and  Â ,f o ra l l ∈  \{ }. In such cases, it is impossible
to have  6∈ 

Â( \{ }),a n dw ea r ed o n ep r o v i n gS Y M .
SYM: Consider a set  with ﬁve elements, let’s say  = {},a n dl e t
be the preference-based bargaining solution that coincides with , except as follows:
Â()=

Â( \{ }), for all  ∈  and all Â∈ () × () such that Â1 and
Â2 are completely opposite on  \{ },a n d is Pareto dominated by either the Â1-
optimal element or the Â2-optimal element, but by no other element of .F o r i n -
stance, Â∗()={}, while 

Â∗()={},w h e n Â∗
1  Â∗
1  Â∗
1  Â∗
1  and
 Â∗
2  Â∗
2  Â∗
2  Â∗
2 . The modiﬁcation thus amounts to add some options to the
fallback solution in some cases, and will satisfy RA af o r t i o r i . By construction,  is
regular and satisﬁes EFF. ATT does not apply in those cases where  is diﬀerent from
 (because the Pareto dominated option falls below an option that is not chosen in the
20quadruplet obtained by deleting that Pareto dominated option), and hence  satisﬁes it
(since  does). Finally, SYM is violated. For instance, Â∗()={},  is selected
from any quadruple that includes it, but  ∈ Â∗(\{}).
5. REVEALED PREFERENCES
The previous two sections suggest that the fallback bargaining procedure may poten-
tially explain systematic violations of WARP in multi-criteria decision problems. One
diﬃculty in testing this hypothesis is that in many situations we do not directly observe
the criteria used by the decision-maker, nor do we observe how the options are ranked
according to each criterion. All we may hope to observe are the ﬁnal choices across diﬀer-
ent decision problems. A natural question that arises is, what properties of these choices
are necessary and suﬃcient to represent the decision-maker as if he has two criteria in
his mind for ranking the options, and he resolves the conﬂict between these criteria by
applying the fallback bargaining procedure? Suppose the observed choices do satisfy the
suﬃcient conditions of the representation, can we identify (at least partially, and, if so,
to what extent) the two underlying linear orderings? We answer both questions in this
section.
These questions are also relevant for understanding the outcomes of some real life
instances of bilateral bargaining between two distinct parties. One example that ﬁts
our framework is the process by which parties to a labor-management dispute choose an
arbitrator from the list provided by the FMCS (see also Bloom and Cavanagh (1986)).
Our main result in this section makes a ﬁrst step towards providing testable implications
of fallback bargaining, which may potentially explain the choices of arbitrators in these
disputes.15
Characterization
T h ea p p r o a c hw et a k ei st ot r ya n da d a p tT h eorem 1 to bargaining solutions that
are not preference-based. Note ﬁrst that the three regularity conditions of the previous
section are no longer useful as they restricted the behavior of the solution across diﬀerent
preference proﬁles. However, the main properties of Theorem 1 can be suitably adapted
15As we discuss in the concluding section, our characterization result relies on the existence of suﬃ-
ciently rich data, which may not be available in empirical applications.
21to the current environment.16
RA and SYM can be rephrased literally:
Removing an Alternative (RA) - If () 6= {},t h e n( \{ }) ∩ () 6= ∅.
Symmetry (SYM) - If  ∈ () and there exists  ∈  \{ } such that  6∈
( \{ }), then there exists 0 ∈  \{ } such that  6∈ ( \{ 0}).
To adapt ATT and EFF, we propose to interpret ({})={} as the observation
that  is “revealed to be Pareto superior” to . That is, whatever dimensions or criteria
the decision-maker uses to evaluate the two options,  is better than  a c c o r d i n gt oa l lo f
them. On the other hand, ({})={} means that there is a negative correlation
when comparing  and  across dimensions:  is preferred to  along one, while  is
preferred to  along the other. EFF and ATT can now be rephrased using only observed
choices:
Eﬃciency (EFF) - If  ∈ (), then there does not exist  ∈  such that ({})=
{}.
Attraction (ATT) - Let  ∈  \  be such that ({})={},f o rs o m e ∈ ().
Then ( ∪ {})={ ∈ ()|({})={}}.
To redeﬁne NBC, we say that  is “revealed to be a compromise between  and ”i f
it is chosen uniquely from {} but no element in this triplet is revealed to be Pareto
superior to another.
No Better Compromise (NBC) - If both  and  belong to (), then there does
not exist  ∈  such that the choice out of any pair in {} is the pair itself, and
({})={}.
The above properties, however, do not guarantee the existence of two linear orderings
such that the decision maker’s choices can be explained by applying the fallback solution.
First, these properties (and in particular, RA, which weakens WARP) do not imply that
the revealed Pareto relation is transitive. Thus, to have any hope of recovering a pair of
preferences, the following condition must be met:
Pairwise Consistency (PC) - If ({})={} and ({})={},t h e n({})=
{}.
S e c o n d ,n o n eo ft h ea b o v ep r o p e r t i e si m p l yt h ec o m p r o m i s ee ﬀect. To see this, suppose
the decision-maker has a pair of orderings in his mind (which are not observeable to us)
16For notational simplicity, we keep the same names for the axioms than in the previous section. Of
course, though their motivation is similar, their formulation is not since the models are diﬀerent. We feel
this would not create any confusion since the implied meaning is clear in each section given the relevant
context.
22such that  Â1  Â1  while  Â1  Â1 . Then a choice rule that picks {} would
satisfy NBC without exhibiting the compromise eﬀe c t . W em u s t ,t h e r e f o r e ,t a k ei n t o
account a new testable implication: if there is no revealed Pareto comparison between
any two elements of {}, then there must be a revealed compromise.
Existence of a Compromise (EC) - If the choice out of any pair in {} is the pair
itself, then ({}) is a singleton.
The next two examples motivate our ﬁnal axiom. They demonstrate that none of our
axioms thus far guarantee that revealed compromises, and their interaction with revealed
Pareto dominance, are consistent with an underlying pair of preferences.
Example 1 Let  = {} and let  be the bargaining solution that selects both ele-
ments out of any pair, and such that ({})={}, ({})={}, ({})=
{}, ({})={},a n d({})={}. It is not diﬃcult to check that  sat-
isﬁes the seven axioms listed so far, but there is no pair (Â1Â2) of linear orderings
such  = 

Â. The inconsistency leading to this impossibility is easy to understand:
({})={} reveals that  is “in between”  and ,w h i l e({})={} and
({})={} reveals that  is “in between” both  and ,a n d and .
Example 2 Let  = {} and let (Â∗
1Â∗
2) be the two linear orderings deﬁned as
follows:  Â∗
1  Â∗
1  Â∗
1  and  Â∗
1  Â∗
1  Â∗
1 .L e t be the bargaining solution such
that ({})={} and ()=

Â∗(), for all  ⊆  diﬀerent from {}.I t i s
not diﬃcult to check that  satisﬁes the seven axioms listed so far, but there is no pair
(Â1Â2) of linear orderings such  = 

Â. The inconsistency here is rooted in the way
revealed Pareto comparisons should combine with revealed ompromises:  is revealed to be
“in between”  and ,  is revealed to be Pareto superior to both  and ,y e t is revealed
non comparable to .
To rule out the inconsistencies illustrated in these examples, we introduce a property
that captures another sense in which compromises have a special status. Suppose  is
revealed to be a compromise between  and . One way to interpret this is that after a
long process of deliberation - where one party argued in favor of  while the other argued
in favor of  - the two parties agreed to settle on  Thus, the choice of  may be viewed
as internalizing all the considerations in favor of each of the alternatives. This suggests
that if a new option,  becomes available, the parties would compare  only with  and
would not ignore the previous arguments that led to the agreement on  by opening up
the discussion on all available options. Furthermore, if reaching a compromise has special
23status to the bargainers, then they would require a good enough reason to abandon it
completely in favor of a new option. In particular, the parties may replace a compromise
with a new option only when the latter Pareto dominates the former.
Overcoming a Compromise (OC) - Suppose that ({})={}, ({})=
{}, ({})={},a n d({})={}.I f ({})={},t h e n
({})={}.
The fallback bargaining solution satisﬁes an axiom of this type for all bargaining prob-
lems, but we phrased it for bargaining problems with only four elements because this is
all what is needed to establish our result, as hinted by the two previous examples.
Our second main result establishes that the testable implications we have identiﬁed
are also suﬃcient to guarantee the existence of two linear orderings such that the decision
maker’s choices may be explained by the fallback solution.
Theorem 2 A bargaining solution  satisﬁe sE F F ,A T T ,N B C ,R A ,S Y M ,P C ,E Ca n d
OC if and only if there exists Â∈ () × () such that  = 

Â.
We start by providing a sketch of the proof of the necessity part in Theorem 2. The
formal proof follows. The argument unfolds in two main steps. First, we show that a
choice correspondence  satisfying EFF, ATT, NBC, RA and SYM exhibits the following
property: if there exists a preference proﬁle Â such that  coincides with 

Â on all pairs
and triplets, then this true on all subsets of . To prove this, we adapt the arguments
from the ﬁrst step of the proof of Theorem 1, which established a similar claim for
preference-based bargaining solutions.
In the second step, the more challenging part of the proof, we construct a preference
proﬁle Â such that  coincides with 

Â on all pairs and triplets. The diﬃculty here lies
in the requirement that two preference relations deﬁn e do no n ep a i ro rt r i p l e tm u s tb e
consistent with relations deﬁn e do nd i ﬀerent pairs and triplets. For example, when we are
given ({})={} we conclude that one bargainer prefers  to  while the other
bargainer has the opposite ranking. Suppose we are also given that ({})={}
Then, again, we conclude that the two bargainers have opposite rankings of  and .T h e
question is, how do we determine whether or not the bargainer who ranks  to  also
ranks  to ?
To answer this question, we use the choice data from triplets, and construct the
two linear orderings inductively. We begin with one pair of elements and construct two
preference relations over them. We then add a third element and extend the previous
pair of preferences to cover all three elements. We then continue adding one element
24a tat i m ea n de x t e n d i n gt h er e l a t i o n sf r o mt h ep r e v i o u ss t e pt oc o v e rt h en e w l ya d d e d
element until we have covered all of .
However, for this construction to succeed, the elements must be added in a particular
order. First, we partition the set of elements into “revealed Pareto layers”. The highest
Pareto layer, denoted 1, consists of all the elements in  that are not revealed
to be Pareto inferior to any other element. Similarly, the second-highest Pareto layer,
2,i sd e ﬁned as the set of elements in \1 that are not revealed to be Pareto
inferior to any element not in 1. The next revealed Pareto layers are deﬁned in
a similar manner. Each Pareto layer  is further partitioned into “inner” layers
deﬁned as follows. The most extreme layer, denoted E1, contains the set of elements
(at most two) that are never revealed to be compromises within the Pareto layer .
T h en e x ti n n e rl a y e rc o n t a i n st h o s ee l e m e n t st h a ta r en e v e rr e v e a l e dt ob ec o m p r o m i s e s
within \E1. Continuing this way we end with the most interior layer. Given these
partitions, the construction of the two preference relations proceeds as follows: we begin
with the highest Pareto layer from which we choose the most extreme points and move
inward. Once we cover the entire Pareto layer, we move to the next Pareto layer and
again, begin with the extreme points and move inwards. A series of lemmas in the proof
of Theorem 2 establish that the above method leads to two preference relations that are
well-deﬁned and transitive.
To better understand the role of the particular method of constructing the preferences,
it is instructive to understand why a simpler inductive argument would not work. Let
 = {} and suppose the two preference relations we wish to uncover are
 Â1  Â1  Â1  Â1  and  Â2  Â2  Â2  Â2  (see Figure 3).
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25Assume we have data on the choices from all subsets of  such that these choices are
consistent with the above two orderings. Assume also that we do not observe the above
orderings but wish to infer them using a simple construction that proceeds in Pareto
layers but pays no attention to whether elements within a Pareto layer are “extreme
points” or not.
According to the data, we may conclude that the highest Pareto layer includes only
 and . Hence, one party ranks  above , while the other ranks  above .S i n c e
we have no information as to which party prefers  and which party prefers ,l e t ’ s
say that one guesses correctly, i.e.  Â∗
2  and  Â∗
1 ,w h e r eÂ∗ is the pair of linear
orderings that we are deriving from observing the data. We next wish to extend these
preference relations to cover the remaining elements. Note that in the second Pareto layer
there are two extreme points,  and  (i.e., E21 = {})a n das i n g l ei n t e r i o rp o i n t ,
(E22 = {}). Suppose that instead of starting with the extreme points,  and ,w es t a r t
with .S i n c e({})={} it must be that  Â∗
1  and  Â∗
2 . This means that
 Â∗
1 .S i n c e({})={} it must be that  Â∗
2  Â∗
2 .N e x tw ea d d.F r o m
({})={} and ({})={} it follows that  Â∗
1  Â∗
1  and  Â∗
2  Â∗
2 .
Since ({})={} o n ep r e f e r e n c eo r d e r i n gr a n k s above  while another ranks
 above .T h e i n f o r m a t i o n o n  and the simple induction construction we are using
do not provide us with any guidance on whether  Â∗
2  or  Â∗
2 .W e m i g h t t h u s
(wrongly) assume that  Â∗
2  and  Â∗
1 , and then obtain that  Â∗
1  Â∗
1  Â∗
1  and
 Â∗
2  Â∗
2  Â∗
2 . Finally, we add .S i n c e({})={} while ({})={}
w ee n du pw i t h Â∗
1  Â∗
1  Â∗
1  Â∗
1  and  Â∗
2  Â∗
2  Â∗
2  Â∗
2 . But if we now apply


Â∗ to {},w eo b t a i n{}, in contradiction to our observation that {} is chosen
from this triplet. Even though the data can be derived as the fallback solution to a pair
of linear orderings, the above method did not guarantee that we will be able to construct
these orderings.
The diﬃcutly in the reasoning of the previous paragraph is that the data gave us
multiple options for deﬁning Â∗ at some steps of the induction, while only some of
them work. Our reﬁned inductive argument, on the other hand, provides a construction
that works if and only if the data can be generated by some pair of linear orderings.
When multiple options for deﬁning the revealed preferences occur, it is only due to a
lack of identiﬁability (see Theorem 3). As an illustration, suppose we constructed the
preference relations using our “double induction” argument. When adding the elements
in 2 = {} w eb e g i nw i t ht h ee x t r e m ep o i n t s ,E1 = {}.S i n c e({})=
{} while ({})={} we have that  Â∗
1  Â∗
1  and  Â∗
2  Â∗
2 .S i n c e
26({})={} while ({})={} we obtain,  Â∗
1  Â∗
1  and  Â∗
2  Â∗
2 .
Therefore,  Â∗
1  Â∗
1  Â∗
1  and  Â∗
2  Â∗
2  Â∗
2 .I t r e m a i n s t o a d d .S i n c e
({})={} and ({})={} it must be that  Â∗
1  Â∗
1  while  Â∗
2  Â∗
2 .
Since ({})={} it must be that  is ranked in between  and .G i v e n o u r
construction, this means that  Â∗
1  Â∗
1  and  Â∗
2  Â∗
2 , and we obtain the desired
pair of orderings.
We are now ready to present the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof:W eh a v ea l r e a d yp r o v e di nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o nt h a t

Â satisﬁes RA, SYM,
EFF, ATT, and NBC, for each Â∈ () × (). PC and EC are straightforward to
check, and hence only OC remains. The fallback solution generates the choice data on
{} as in OC only if  Â  Â  and  Â−  Â− ,f o rs o m e ∈ {12}.H e n c e
the minimal score of  in the quadruplet is at least 1.F o r  to be chosen alone, it
must be better than at least two alternatives for each ordering, and hence  Â ,o r


Â({})={}, as desired.
Let now  be a bargaining solution that satisﬁes SYM, RA, PC, EFF, ATT, NBC,
EC and EXP. It is not diﬃcult to adapt the argument from the ﬁr s ts t e pi nt h ep r o o fo f
Theorem 1 to show that  = 

Â if Â∈ () × () is such that ()=

Â() for all
 ⊆  with two or three elements. The diﬃcult part is to show that there indeed exists
ap a i r(Â1Â2) of linear orderings such that ()=

Â() for all  ⊆  with two or
three elements. We will proceed via an inductive argument. For each strictly positive
integer ,l e t be the following subset of :

 = { ∈  \ [∪
−1
=0
]| 6 ∃ ∈  \ [∪
−1
=0
]:({})={}}
(with the convention 0 = ∅). 1 is the set of elements that are -Pareto eﬃ-
cient in . 2 is the set of alternatives that are -Pareto eﬃcient in  \ 1.
These are “second-best” options in .N o t i c et h a t is nonempty, for each  such
that  \ [∪
−1
=1] is nonempty, since  is ﬁnite and  satisﬁes PC. Let  be the
smallest positive integer such that +1 = ∅.  is thus partitioned into a collection
()
=1 of layers of options that are constrained eﬃc i e n ta td i ﬀerent levels .
Each such Pareto layer needs itself to be partitioned into subsets of one or two ele-
ments, as follows:
E
 = { ∈ 
 \ [∪
−1
=0E
]| 6 ∃ ∈ 
 \ [∪
−1
=0E
]:({})={}}
for each  ∈ {1}, and each strictly positive integer  (with the convention E0 = ∅,
27for each ). EC implies that a single element must be chosen out of any triplet in .
E1 is the set of elements that are never chosen out of any such triplets. These can be
interpreted as extreme elements of the layer . E2 is the set of elements that are
extreme in the sub-layer  \E1, and so on so forth. The next lemma, whose proof
is available in the Appendix, highlights the structure of these sets.
Lemma 2 Let  ∈ {1},a n dl e t be a strictly positive integer. If \[∪
−1
=1E]
has at least two elements, then E is nonempty and contains exactly two elements.
Let  be the smallest positive integer such that E+1 = ∅.  is thus par-
titioned into a collection (E)

=1 of pairs of alternatives (and perhaps one singleton if
E contains only one element). An element that belongs to a layer E for some large 
can be interpreted as not too extreme, in that it is chosen as a compromise out of more
triplets in .
We are now ready to deﬁne Â, and prove that ()=

Â() for every  ⊆  with
two or three elements, by induction. We start with a pair of elements in , then add
a third element, and so on so forth up to the point all the elements of  have been
c o n s i d e r e d .W eh a v et ob ec a r e f u l ,t h o u g h ,t of o l l o ws o m es p e c i a lo r d e rf o rt h ea r g u m e n t
to work. It follows from our previous deﬁnition that each element of  belongs to a
unique atom E,f o rs o m e ∈ {1 } and some  ∈ {1}.T h i sf a c tw i l lh e l p
us determine the right order in which elements must be added. Indeed, let (()())
be these two positive integer associated to . We will follow the convention that  is
added before 0 if (()()) is lexicographically inferior to ((0)(0)). A sw ek n o w
from Lemma 2, this rule does not uniquely specify the ordering, as an atom E usually
contains two elements. We do not further specify how elements are added in the inductive
a r g u m e n t ,a st h i si si n c o n s e q u e n t i a lf o rt h ec o n s t r u c t i o no fÂ,a n dt h ep r o o ft h a t = 

Â
on pairs and triplets.17
Let  and  be the two ﬁrst elements of  for which Â must be deﬁned. If ({})=
{}, then we impose that  Â1  and  Â2 . Similarly, if ({})={},t h e nw e
impose that  Â1  and  Â2 .F i n a l l y , i f ({})={},t h e nw ei m p o s et h a t
 Â1  and  Â2 ,o r Â1  and  Â2 . Either way works, and one may chooses one
of the two options arbitrarily. Of course, ({})=

Â({}),b yc o n s t r u c t i o n .
Suppose now that Â has been deﬁned on a subset  of ,a n dt h a t()=

Â() for
each  ⊆  with two or three elements, while the next element to be added is  ∈  \.
17Identiﬁability, i.e. the possibility of ﬁnding multiple pairs of ordering Â such that  = 

Â,i st h e
subject of the next theorem.
28We now deﬁne the extension Â∗ over  ∪{}.O fc o u r s e ,Â∗ is deﬁn e ds oa st oc o i n c i d e
with Â on ,i . e . Â∗
  if and only if  Â ,f o re a c h ∈  and each  =1 2.T h e
important question to answer is how elements of  compare with  under Â∗.F o rt h i s ,
we partition  into two subsets:
 = { ∈ |({})={}}
 = { ∈ |({})={}}
Notice that  ∩  = ∅,a n d =  ∪ , because there is no  ∈  such that
({})={} (given the way we add elements in our inductive argument). For
each  ∈ ,w ei m p o s e Â∗
1  and  Â∗
2 . As for an element  ∈ ,w em u s t
distinguish two cases. In the ﬁrst case, we assume that there exists 0 ∈  such that
({0})={}.T h e nw ei m p o s e Â∗
1  and  Â∗
2  when there exists  ∈  such
that  Â1  and ({})={},a n d Â∗
1  and  Â∗
2  when there exists  ∈ 
such that  Â1  and ({})={}. We need to check that this is well-deﬁned.
This follows from the next lemma, whose proof is available in the appendix.
Lemma 3 If there exists 0 ∈  such that ({0})={},t h e n ,f o re a c h ∈ ,
there exists  ∈  such that ({})={}. In addition, if 0 ∈  are such that
({})=({0})={},t h e n Â  if and only if  Â 0,f o rb o t h =1 2.
In the second case, namely when there does not exist 0 ∈  such that ({0})=
{},w ei m p o s e Â∗
1  and  Â∗
2  if there exists  ∈  and  ∈  such that  Â1 ,
and  Â∗
1  and  Â∗
2  if there exists  ∈  and  ∈  such that  Â2 .I ft h e r ei s
no  ∈  and no  ∈  such that either  Â∗
1  or  Â∗
2 , then one is free to choose
either deﬁnition, i.e.  Â∗
1  and  Â∗
2 , for all  ∈ ,o r Â∗
1  and  Â∗
2 , for all
 ∈ . Here too we need to check that this is well deﬁned. This follows from the next
lemma, whose proof is available in the appendix.
Lemma 4 If there does not exist 0 ∈  such that ({0})={}, then there do
not exist 
0 ∈  and 0 ∈  such that  Â2  and 0 Â1 
0.
Now that the pair Â∗ of linear orderings has been deﬁned on ∪{}, we should check
that they are transitive, i.e. for  =1 2,  Â∗
  if  Â  and  Â∗
 ,  Â  if  Â∗
 
and  Â∗
 , and the reverse rankings of both of these cases. We postpone the argument
to the appendix.
29We will be done with our inductive argument and the proof of Step 2 after proving
that ()=

Â∗(),f o ra l l ⊆  ∪ {} with two or three elements. When  ∈ 
this follows directly from the inductive step. Consider some pair {},w h e r e ∈ .
If  ∈ ,t h e n({})={} and Â∗ satisﬁes:  Â∗
1  and  Â∗
2 . Hence,


Â∗({})={} as well, as desired. If  ∈ ,t h e n({})={} and Â∗
satisﬁes:  Â∗
  and  Â∗
−  for some  ∈ {12}.H e n c e ,

Â∗({})={} as well,
as desired.
Consider next a triplet {}.I f{} ⊆ ,t h e n Â∗  and  Â∗ .T h ei n -
ductive step and ATT imply: ({})=({})=

Â∗({})=

Â∗({}),
as desired.
Suppose next that only one of the alternatives in {},s a y,b e l o n g st o,i n
which case  ∈ . PC implies that ({})={} or {}.I n t h e f o r m e r c a s e , 
is the only -eﬃcient (resp. Â∗-eﬃcient) option in {}, and hence ({})=
{} = 

Â∗({}), by EFF, as desired. If ({})={},t h e n({})={}
by ATT. The constructed preference proﬁle Â∗ satisﬁes  Â∗
  Â∗
  and  Â∗
−  Â∗
− 
( h e r ew eu s et h ef a c tt h a tÂ∗
 is transitive, which is proven in the appendix), for some
 ∈ {12}. Hence 

Â∗({})={} as well, as desired.
Finally, we consider the case in which neither  nor  belong to .T h i s m e a n s
that  ∈ . Suppose that ({}) is a singleton, say {}. Then, ({})=
{}, by ATT. The constructed preference proﬁle Â∗ satisﬁes  Â∗
  Â∗
  and  Â∗
−
 Â∗
−  (again, remember that Â∗
 and Â∗
− are transitive), for some  ∈ {12}.H e n c e


Â∗({})={} as well, as desired.
Now comes the last, and most diﬃcult, case where ({})={} and  ∈ .
By construction,  Â  and  Â− ,f o rs o m e ∈ {12}. Since the choice out of any
pair in {} is the pair itself, EC implies that ({}) is a singleton. Assume
w.l.o.g. that  has been added before  in the induction.
If ({})={}, then by construction,  Â∗
  Â∗
  and  Â∗
  Â∗
 .
Therefore, 

Â∗({})={} as well, as desired.
Assume ({})={}. Observe that () ≤ () ≤ (),s i n c e is added after
,a n d after . In addition, ,  and  cannot all lie in the same -Pareto layer,
i.e. ()  (). To see why, suppose on the contrary that {} ⊆ ().T h e n
() ≤ () ≤ (),s i n c e is added after ,  is added after . Hence, by the deﬁnition of
E()(), ({}) 6= {}, a contradiction. Since ()  (),t h e r em u s te x i s t0 ∈ 
such that (0)=() and ({0})={0}. Lemma 9 from the Appendix implies
that ({0})={}. Hence 

Â({0})={}, by the induction hypothesis, and
30we must have: 0 Â  Â  and  Â−  Â− 0.S i n c e({0})={0},w ek n o wt h a t
0 Â∗ . By transitivity, we get  Â∗
− .S i n c e({})={},w eh a v e Â∗
 .
Hence 

Â∗({})={}, as desired.
Assume ﬁnally that ({})={}.I f()=()=(),t h e n() ≤ () ≤
(),s i n c e is added after ,a n d after . In order to have ({})={},i tm u s t
be that ()  (),b yd e ﬁnition of E()(). Lemma 2 implies that there exists another
element 0 in E()().S i n c e()  (),i tm u s tb et h a t({0})={}.I no r d e rt o
satisfy the induction hypothesis and the convention  Â ,w em u s th a v e Â 0.S i n c e
()  (),i tm u s tb et h a t({0})={}. The second statement from Lemma
7 in the Appendix implies that ({0}) 6= {},s i n c e({})={}.O n t h e
other hand, ({0}) must be a singleton by EC, and cannot be {0} either, since
(0)  () ≤ (). Hence ({0})={},a n d Â∗
 ,b yd e ﬁnition. We conclude
that  Â  Â∗
  and  Â∗
−  Â− , which implies 

Â∗({})={}, as desired.
To conclude, suppose that ()  ().S i n c e({})={} and ({})=
{}, we have three cases to consider:
Case 1)  Â  Â∗
  and  Â∗
−  Â− ,
Case 2)  Â∗
  Â∗
  and  Â∗
−  Â∗
− ,a n d
Case 3)  Â∗
  Â  and  Â−  Â∗
− .
If Case 1 prevails, then 

Â∗({})={}. So we will be done after proving that
Cases 2 and 3 are impossible.
I nC a s e2t h e r ea r ee l e m e n t so nb o t hs i d e so f according to Â∗, hence, we may apply
Lemma 3. Thus, there exists 0 ∈  such that ({0})={}. I tm u s tb et h a t
({0})={0}, as otherwise we get a contradiction with ({})={} via
Lemma 9. Since  Â∗
 ,i tm u s tb et h a t Â 0. Transitivity of Â∗ also implies that
 Â . So we have two subcases to consider:
Case 2a:  Â  Â 0 and vice versa for − (because the choice out of both {}
and {0} is the pair itself), and
Case 2b:  Â 0 Â  and vice versa for −.
Knowing that ({0})={} and ({})={}, subcase 2b (leading to
({0})={0}, by the induction hypothesis) is incompatible with RA, given that
({0}) contains at most two elements (see Lemma 5 in the Appendix). RA can
be satisﬁed in case 2a only if ({0})={} or {}.T h e f o r m e r l e a d s t o a
contradiction with EXP. In the second case, notice that a single option must be selected
out of {0} by EC, and it must be  b yR Aa n dS Y M .R e c a l lt h a t Â 0 in case
2a, and hence,  Â∗
  by deﬁnition of Â∗, in contradiction to Case 2.
31As for Case 3, let 0 ∈ () be such that ({0})={0}.H e n c e 0 Â∗
 ,
by deﬁnition, and transitivity implies that 0 Â  Â . ({0})={0} then
implies  Â−  Â− 0. On the one hand, we could conclude that ({0})={0},
and hence ({0})={} by Lemma 9, or 

Â({0})={}, by the induction
hypothesis. On the other hand, if one can compute 

Â({0}) directly from Â,i n
which case one gets {}, hence the contradiction. ¥
We next prove the independence of the axioms appearing in Theorem 2.
EFF: Consider the choice correspondence Â∗ introduced when showing that EFF does
not follow from the other axioms in Theorem 1. A similar argument implies that Â∗
satisﬁes the current versions of ATT, NBC, RA, and SYM, but violates EFF. EC and
PC are satisﬁed since Â∗ coincides with the fallback solution on pairs and triplets. OC
does not apply, and is thus satisﬁed trivially.
ATT:L e tÂ be a pair of linear orderings on  satisfying that there exists at least one
pair of elements,  ∈  such that  Â .D e ﬁne () be a choice correspondence
deﬁned as the fallback solution applied only to the set of Â-Pareto eﬃcient alternatives
in , ()=

Â[Â()],w h e r eÂ() is deﬁned in (1). We’ve already shown
that this choice correspondence violates ATT, while satisfying NBC, RA, EFF and SYM.
({})={} and ({})={} imply that  Â  and  Â  w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e s
that  Â  and hence, ({})={}.T h i sv e r i ﬁes PC. If the choice out of any pair
in {} is the pair itself, then Â({})={} Since 

Â({}) is a
singleton, so is ({}) which veriﬁes EC. Suppose the choice out of any pair in
{} is the pair itself and ({})={}. Then both individuals must rank  in
between  and .I f({})={},t h e n cannot be Pareto dominated by any
of the elements. It is easy to check that, if  does not Pareto dominate  then  also
belongs to ({}) ac o n t r a d i c t i o n . H e n c e ,i tm u s tb et h a t Â  conﬁrming
OC.
NBC: Consider two orderings Â1 and Â2 that are opposite on :  Â1  if and only if
 Â2 .L e tt h e n be the choice correspondence deﬁned as follows: ()=

Â() if 
h a se x a c t l yt h r e ee l e m e n t s ,a n d()= otherwise.  satisﬁes EFF and ATT trivially
since no two elements are Pareto comparable under Â. NBC is clearly violated in sets
with at least four elements.  is larger than the fallback solution applied to Â, and hence
 satisﬁes RA. SYM are trivially satisﬁed when applied to any set whose cardinality is
not equal to four. For any element in a quadruplet, there exists a triplet where that
element is available, yet not selected, and hence SYM is veriﬁed. PC and EC are satisﬁed
32since  coincides with the fallback on pairs and triplets. OC does not apply since 
never selects a singleton in quadruplets.
RA: As in the previous example, two orderings Â1 and Â2 that are opposite on .
Inspired by Masatlioglu et al. (2009), suppose that the decision maker can pay attention
to at most ﬁve options. Formally, he has an attention ﬁlter  : () → (): () ⊂ ,
for all  ⊆  such that |()| =m i n {5||} and  ∈ () if  ∈  ⊆ . We will assume
in addition that, if  and  belong to (), then there does not exist  ∈ \() that falls
in between  and  according to Â (it is easy to construct various attention ﬁlters with
this property). Let then ()=

Â(()). EFF and ATT are both satisﬁed because
t h ec h o i c eo u to fa n yp a i ri st h ep a i ri t s e l f .E Ci ss a t i s ﬁed because the choice out of any
triplet is a singleton. NBC is satisﬁed because of the second property we imposed on the
attention ﬁlter. OC is satisﬁed because there is no singleton choice out of quadruplets.
PC is satisﬁed because the choice out of any pair is the pair itself. If () contains
two elements, then it must be that  contains at most four elements, in which case 
coincides with the fallback, and hence  satisﬁes SYM. Finally, let’s check that  violates
RA. Indeed, let  be a set that contains six elements. Let  be the element of  that
does not belong to ().L e t be such that  is better than the element selected in 
for Â. Let then  ∈ () be an option that is worse than the element selected in  for
Â. It is easy to check that the element selected in  \{ } is diﬀerent from the element
selected in , thereby showing that RA is violated.
SYM: Consider the choice correspondence Â∗ introduced when showing that SYM does
not follow from the other axioms in Theorem 1. A similar argument implies that Â∗
satisﬁes the current versions of EFF, ATT, NBC, and RA, but violates SYM. PC, EC
and OC are satisﬁed since Â∗ coincides with the fallback solution on pairs and triplets.
PC:L e t be a strict complete and transitive ordering on ,a n dl e t be the choice
obtained by maximizing this ordering, except that ({})={},w h e r e is the
best element in  and  is the worst element in .I ti se a s yt oc h e c kt h a t satisﬁes
all the axioms of Theorem 2, except PC.
EC: Consider the analogue of the Borda rule introduced in the previous section to show
that NBC is not implied by the other axioms in Theorem 1. We already proved that
it satiﬁes EFF, ATT, NBC, RA, and SYM, for any given pair of preferences. PC is
straightforward to check, and OC never applies because the choice out of any triplet is
the triplet itself if no two elements are Pareto comparable. For the same reason, the
choice correspondence will violate EC, as soon as there are at least three elements that
33are not Pareto comparable.
OC: See the two examples given before introducing OC.
Identiﬁability
There is no hope to identify uniquely the underlying preference relations on both
dimensions. Indeed, there is no way to tell which ordering should be associated to a
speciﬁc self or dimension of choice: if  = 

Â,f o rs o m ep a i r(Â1Â2) of linear orderings
on ,t h e nw ea l s oh a v e = 

(Â2Â1) (cf. second regularity condition in the previous
section). One may wonder whether this is the only source of multiplicity. The answer is
not quite, but almost, as the following example and theorem illustrate.
Example 3 Consider  = {} and  = 

Â,w h e r e Â1  Â1  Â1  and
 Â2  Â2  Â2 .I ti sn o td i ﬃcult to check that  is also equal to 

Â0,w h e r e Â0
1  Â0
1
 Â0
1  and  Â0
2  Â0
2  Â0
2 . The careful reader will notice that Â0 is obtained from Â by
exchanging the preferences of the two selves only as far as  and  are concerned. This
change is irrelevant as far as the fallback bargaining solution is concerned, because both 
and  Pareto dominate both  and  according to Â,i m p l y i n gt h a t and  are irrelevant
when it comes to determine the solution of any subset  of  that include either , ,o r
both.
As u b s e t of  is -dominant if it is non-empty and ({})={}, for all  ∈ 
and all  ∈  \ .18 Observe that if  and 0 are both -dominant, then  ⊆ 0 or
0 ⊆ .A l s o is trivially -dominant. So there exists a unique minimal -dominant
set ∗
1 in . Similarly, a subset  of  \ ∗
1 is -dominant in  \ ∗
1 if it is non-empty
and ({})={}, for all  ∈ ∗
1 and all  ∈  \ ( ∪ ∗
1).L e t∗
2 be the minimal -
dominant set in \∗
1. Iterating the procedure, one obtains a partition of  into a ﬁnite
sequence Π =( ∗
1∗
) of sets with the property that ∗
 is the minimal -dominant
set in  \ ∪
−1
=1∗
.
Theorem 3 Let ÂÂ0 be two pairs of strict linear orderings. Then 

Â = 

Â0 if and
only if Â0 can be obtained from Â by permuting the two orderings over atoms of Π that
contains at least two elements.
Proof:T h es u ﬃcient condition is easy to check, and we focus attention only on the
necessary condition. Let  be the common bargaining solution. Since it coincides with
18If  satisﬁes EFF, then  is -dominant if and only if () ⊆ ,f o re a c h ⊆  such that ∩ 6= ∅.
34the fallback bargaining solution for some pair of orderings, it satisﬁes the axioms listed
in the previous section, and the induction we followed in the proof of Theorem 2 can
be reproduced here as well. Let Â∗denote the preference proﬁle that is constructed in
the induction procedure, such that  = 

Â∗ (note that Â∗ may be diﬀerent from Â or
Â0). For any  ∈  we write (()()) ≤ (()()) to mean that (()()) is
lexicographically l o w e ro re q u a lt o(()()), i.e., either ()  () or ()=() and
() ≤ ().
Let  and  be the ﬁrst and second elements in the induction, i.e., for all  ∈ \{},
(()()) ≤
 (()()) 
 (()())
If ()  (), then there is only one proﬁle of ranking that is consistent with :b o t h
agents rank  above .I f ()=(),t h e nb o t h Â∗
1 ,  Â∗
2  and  Â∗
2 ,  Â∗
1 
are consistent with  . Moreover, these are the only consistent proﬁles: i.e., either Â∗
and Â agree on {},o rÂ∗ and Â0 agree. Fix one of these proﬁles. Let  be the ﬁrst
element in the induction (following  and ) with the property that there exists 0 with
((0)(0)) ≤ (()()) such that either Â∗ and Â or Â∗ and Â0 diﬀer on {0}.
We ﬁrst establish that the following must then be true: there is no 0 ∈  such
that ({0})={},a n dt h e r ei sn o ∈  and no  ∈  such that either  Â∗
1 
or  Â∗
2 .T ob e g i n ,n o t et h a t0  ∈ , since then both agents must rank 0 above .
Therefore, 0 ∈ . Suppose there exist 0 ∈  such that ({0})={}.T h e n
by Lemma (3), there must exist 0 ∈  such that ({00})={}.S i n c e 0 and
0 were added before  in the induction, the agents’ preferences over them has already
been determined. Moreover, having ﬁxed the ordering of the ﬁrst two elements in the
induction, our deﬁnition of  implies that there is only one preference proﬁle over {0 0},
which is consistent with . Assume, w.l.o.g. that this proﬁle is 0 Â∗
1 0 and 0 Â∗
2 0.
Then it must be that all three preference proﬁles, Â, Â0 and Â∗,r a n k in between 0
and 0. Hence, these preference proﬁles all agree on the rankings of 0 relative to ,i n
contradiction to the deﬁnition of  and 0.
Suppose next that there exist no 0 ∈  such that ({0})={}.N o t e
that this means that ()  ().C o n s i d e rﬁrst the case in which there exists  ∈ 
and 0 ∈  such that 0 Â∗
 .S i n c e 0 ∈ ,P Ti m p l i e st h a t({0})={0},
and hence,  Â∗
− 0. By our construction of Â∗, 0 Â∗
  and  Â∗
− 0.B y L e m m a
(well-def2), either 0 Â∗
  and  Â∗
− 0,o r Â∗ 0. By our induction and the deﬁnition
of , the preference proﬁle Â∗ coincides with both Â and Â0 on {0}.
35Suppose 0 Â∗
  and  Â∗
− 0.S i n c e ∈ ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a ta l lt h r e ep r o ﬁles,
Â, Â0 and Â∗, satisfy that agent 1 and 2 rank  above . Hence, by transitivity, all three
proﬁles satisfy that agent  ranks 0 above  and  above . Assume w.l.o.g. that Â∗
diﬀers from Â.T h e ni tm u s tb et h a te i t h e r Â∗
− 0 Â∗
−  but  Â−  Â− 0 or that
 Â− 0 Â−  but  Â∗
−  Â∗
− 0.B u ti fa g e n t− ranks 0 above  then we get that
a contradiction to 0 ∈ . Therefore, both Â∗ and Â must satisfy that agent − ranks
 above  and  above 0. But this contradicts our deﬁnition of  and 0.
Next, suppose  Â∗ 0.T h e n0 Â∗
  Â∗
 0 Â∗
  and  Â∗
−  Â∗
− 0 Â∗
− 0. Assume
w.l.o.g. that Â∗ diﬀers from Â. Then it must be that  Â 0 while 0 Â− .S i n c e
Â∗ and Â coincide on {0 0},w eh a v et h a t0 Â∗
 0 Â∗
  and  Â∗
− 0 Â∗
− 0 while
0 Â  Â 0 and 0 Â∗
−  Â∗
− 0.B u t t h i s m e a n s t h a t 

Â∗({0 0})={0} while


Â({0 0})={}, a contradiction.
It follows that there are no 0 ∈  such that ({0})={},a n dt h e r ei sn o
 ∈  and no  ∈  such that either  Â∗
1  or  Â∗
2 .S i n c e0 ∈ ,w ea l s ok n o w
that  is non-empty.
We now prove that  is -dominant. Consider some  ∈  and  ∈  \ .
We have to prove that ({})={}.I f  is added before  in the induction, then
 ∈ , and the result follows trivially from the conclusion that no element in  is
ever chosen in a pair containing an element in . Suppose now that  is added after 
in the induction, i.e. (()()) lexicographically dominates (()()). Suppose ﬁrst
that ()=(). Since there is no 0 ∈  such that ({0})={},i tm u s tb e
that ()=1 .S i n c e is non-empty, it must be that there exists another element 0
such that (0)=() that has been added before  - this must be the other element of
the atom E(()1) (remember that those atoms contain at most two elements, see Lemma
???). Hence ({0})={}. Since there is no element in  and no element in
 from which  picks both elements, ({0})={}.S i n c e = Â,w em u s th a v e
 Â ,  Â 0,a n dt h e r ee x i s t s ∈ {12} such that  Â  Â 0 and 0 Â  Â .
Hence ({})={}, as desired. Finally, if ()  (),t h e nt h e r ee x i s t s00 such
that (00)=() and ({00})={00} (00 could be  itself). By essentially the same
argument as above, we may conclude that ({00})={}, and hence, ({})={},
by PT, as desired.
Fix now an atom ∗ of the partition. We will prove that Â and Â∗ must be the same
or a permunation of each other on ∗. This will conclude the proof, since there is only
one way of patching together the orderings obtained on the diﬀerent atoms of Π ( Â 
if and only if  belongs to an atom that comes before the atom to which  belongs).
36For the sake of notational simplicity, we will assume that ∗ = , but of course the
reasoning can be reproduced with any set ∗ that has at least two elements, since  is
an arbitrary set throughout the paper. Let us add elements as in the induction from
the proof of theorem 2. Let  be the ﬁrst two elements to be considered. Notice that
({})={}, as otherwise either {} or {} would be -dominant, a contradiction
with the fact that  d o e sn o tc o n t a i na n ys t r i c ts u b s e tt h a ti s-dominant. Let  be
such that  Â ,  Â− ,  Â0
 ,  Â0
− . The previous paragraph shows that the last
case when deﬁning the extension of Â∗ when adding  in the induction cannot occur. In
the three other cases, it is not diﬃcult to check that the way we deﬁned the extension
i st h eo n l yw a yp o s s i b l et oh a v et h a t coincides with the fallback bargaining solution
for the extended ordering. Hence by induction, it must be that Â=Â0
 and Â−=Â0
−.I f
 = ,t h e nÂ=Â0 (on ∗). Otherwise Â0 is simply a permutation of Â,a sd e s i r e d .¥
6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Testable implications on limited data sets
The axioms listed in Section 5 remain of course necessary conditions for any data set
to be consistent with the fallback solution for some pair of linear orderings. Theorem 2
establishes that they are also suﬃcient when working with a complete data set. While
suﬃciency is also guaranteed on some smaller data sets, it remains an open question to
characterize all those data sets that guarantee suﬃciency, and to propose new independent
testable implications otherwise. In contrast, rationality is equivalent to the standard IIA
axiom on any data set that includes observations on all subsets of two or three elements.
The diﬀerence in results comes from the fact that our axioms of consistency across subsets
(e.g., RA and OC) focus, for simplicity in the absence of rationality, on marginal changes
- removing or adding a single alternative.
Even so, Theorem 2 is useful in providing an eﬃcient method for verifying whether
a limited data set is consistent with the fallback solution for some preference proﬁle,
and in deriving the corresponding preferences of the selves/bargainers. Indeed, its proof
provides an algorithm for constructing a candidate proﬁle of preferences. Given this
proﬁle, we can compute the fallback solution to predict the choice from any subset. A
data set that includes observations on all subsets of two or three elements is consistent
with the fallback bargaining solution for some pairs of linear orderings if and only if
predictions match actual data. Using this method instead of the alternative procedure
37of constructing all possible preference proﬁles and checking for each one whether it can
generate the data set with the fallback solution brings the computational complexity from
exponential down to polynomial.
Allowing for indiﬀerences
Throughout our analysis we assumed that the bargainers have strict preferences over
. Allowing for indiﬀerences complicates the analysis, and it remains an open question
how to extend our results to allow for indiﬀerence. One promising direction is to consider
t h ec a s ew h e r e has a product structure,  = 1 × 2, while criterion º on  is
assumed to be strict on  (but note that multiple elements of  may now have the
same -component). Axioms would have to be adapted in some cases, for instance EFF
w o u l dh a v et ob es t r e n g t h e n e dt oan o t i o no fs t r o n ge ﬃciency, but we expect that the
essence of our three theorems would extend to this new framework.
More than two bargainers
A natural extension of our analysis is to situation in which the elements of choice
have more than two dimensions (and the decision-maker is able to process more than two
dimensions), or where there are more than two distinct individuals engaged in bargaining.
While it is easy to extend the fallback solution to more than two selves, more work is
needed to see how the characterization results would extend, both mathematically and
in terms of the interpretation of the axioms. One diﬃculty, for instance, would be the
deﬁnition of a compromise. Our view of a compromise was of an element that in some
sense both bargainers rank “in between” other elements which one bargainer ranks in the
opposite way to the other bargainer (geometrically it means that the compromise falls
in the rectangle constructed on the two other alternatives). The question is, how do we
extend this notion of “betweenness ” to more than two bargainers, and how to interpret
it in terms of choice behavior? It is interesting to note in that respect that almost all
the experiments on the attraction and compromise eﬀects were done on two-dimensional
elements.
When alternatives have more than two dimensions, one may further question our
assumption that all dimensions are treated equally. A natural extension would be to
allow the individual to put diﬀerent weights on diﬀerent dimensions, and to make a choice
according to, say, a “weighted” fallback solution. When the weights of the dimensions
and the ranking within each dimension are not observeable, the revealed exercise would
38be to try and infer both from observed choices. One potential concern with this is
identiﬁability: the additional freedom to choose the weights on the dimensions may allow
the same choice correspondence to be consistent with a wide variety of preferences.
Finally, it is worth noting that the predictive power of the fallback solution diminishes
with the number of bargainers since the maximal number of elements it can choose
equals the number of bargainers. However, it may very well be that, indeed, if we were to
replicate the experiments of the attraction and compromise eﬀects with three-dimensional
alternatives, the distribution of choices would cover all three options when oﬀering three
options that cannot be Pareto ranked.
Intensities
One has the intuition that the prevalence of the attraction and compromise eﬀects
in applications may depend on factors that cannot be captured in our ordinal model.
More speciﬁcally, choices may be inﬂuenced by some trade-oﬀst h a ti n v o l v ean o t i o no f
distance or intensity. An individual may exhibit a compromise eﬀect when  =( 1 0 0 1),
 =( 5 0 50) and  =( 1 100), but (perhaps) not when  =( 2 2). Similarly, an he
may be more likely to exhibit the attraction eﬀect when  =( 6 0 40),  =( 5 9 39) and
 =( 4 0 60), but (perhaps) not when  =( 4 1 39). Extending our analysis in this direction
is certainly an interesting topic for future research. Note though that the analysis may
now depend crucially on the context to which it is designed to be applied, as the model
would have to express what it means for two options to be ‘close’ or ‘far away’ on each
dimension. Perhaps a more promising avenue would be to derive these intensities, and
the relevant trade-oﬀs, from the observed choices, but the added ﬂexibility may result in
few testable implications. In addition to being detail-free, our ordinal approach has the
advantage of allowing straightforward comparisons to existing standard models of choice.
We hope that it will also serve as a benchmark for future extensions.
APPENDIX
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
Necessary Condition for Subcase 1:S u p p o s e t h a t 

Â()={}.F o r e a c h
 ∈  \{ } and each  ∈  \{ },w eh a v e :
min
=12
( \{ }Â) ≥ min
=12
(Â) − 1 ≥ min
=12
(Â) ≥ min
=12
( \{ }Â)
39and hence  ∈ 

Â( \{ }), as desired.
Let now  ∈  \{ }.S u p p o s et h a t ∈ argmin=12 (Â).I ft h e r ee x i s t s ∈ 
such that  Â ,t h e nw eh a v e :
min
=12
( \{ }Â) ≥ min
=12
(Â) − 1  min
=12
(Â) − 1=m i n
=12
( \{ }Â)
and hence  6∈ 

Â( \{ }). If there does not exist  ∈  such that  Â ,t h e n
min=12 (\{}Â)=0 ,a n d 6∈ 

Â(\{}),f o re a c h ∈ \{},s i n c e|\{}| ≥
3, and the minimal score attained at the chosen element(s) is always larger or equal to
the ﬁrst integer below half the number of elements in the choice set.
Necessary Condition for Subcase 2: Suppose that 

Â()={}.L e t  ∈  \
{}. Let’s assume that argmin=12 (Â)=1and argmin=12 (Â)=2(a
similar reasoning applies if 1 and 2 are exchanged).
Observe that it is impossible to have  Â1  and  Â2 , since the minimal score of
 in  would then be larger than the minimal score of both  and . The minimal score
of  (resp. )i st h es a m ei nb o t h and  \{ } if  Â2  (resp.  Â1 ), and therefore
remains strictly larger than the minimal score of any element in  \{ } (since it
does not increase by deleting ). Hence 

Â( \{ }) ⊆ {},a sd e s i r e d .
Suppose now that 

Â( \{})={}.T h i si st r u ei fa n do n l yi f Â1  and  Â2 .
Hence there exists 0 ∈  such that  Â1 0 and 0 Â2 , as otherwise the minimal score
of  is strictly larger than the minimal score of ,a n d

Â( \{ 0})={},a sd e s i r e d .
Last Statements of the Lemma:S u p p o s et h a t

Â()={},a n d

Â( \{ })=
{},f o ra l l ∈  \{ }. Continuing with the notations introduced to prove the
necessary condition for subcase 2, we already observed that it is impossible to ﬁnd a  ∈ 
such that  Â1  and  Â2 . The previous paragraph also implies that 

Â( \{ })=
{} if and only if we don’t have  Â1  and  Â2 ,n o r Â1  and  Â2 .H e n c e
 Â  and  Â ,a sd e s i r e d .
Suppose now that 

Â()={}, 

Â( \{ })={},a n d

Â( \{ })={}.I f
 Â ,t h e n looses one point along both dimensions when dropping , and the minimal
score of  remains strictly larger than that of  in  \{ }, hence a contradiction with


Â( \{ })={}. Similarly, it cannot be that  Â . There is no Pareto relation
between  and ,a n d and  either, since 

Â(\{})={} and 

Â(\{})={}.
Let  ∈ {12} be such that  Â . Three cases remain possible: 1)  Â  Â  and
 Â−  Â− ;2 ) Â  Â  and  Â−  Â− ;o r3 ) Â  Â  and  Â−  Â− .
Consider case 1).S i n c e is above  along − and 

Â( \{ })={},i tm u s tb et h a t
40the minimal score of  in  \{ } is attained along the -dimension, and is equal to the
minimal score of  in  \{ } which is attained along the −-dimension. Adding ,t h e
minimal score of  increases by one point, while that of  remains unchanged, hence a
contradiction with 

Â()={}. Case 3) leads to a similar contradiction. Hence only
case 2) remains, as desired.
Suﬃcient Condition for Subcase 1: Assuming that conditions 1(a) and (b) are true,
we need to prove that 

Â()={}.I f 

Â()={} for some  ∈  \{ },t h e nt h e
necessary condition for subcase 1 implies that  ∈ 

Â(\{}),f o ra l l ∈ \{},t h e r e b y
contradicting 1(b). If 

Â()={} for some  ∈ \{}, then the necessary condition
for subcase 2 implies that 

Â( \{ }) ⊆ {}, for all  ∈ , thereby contradicting
1(a). Finally, suppose that 

Â()={} for some  ∈  \{}. Condition 1(b) implies
that there exists  ∈  \{ } such that  6∈ 

Â( \{ }). The necessary condition for
subcase 2 implies that there exists 0 ∈  \{ } such that 

Â( \{ 0})={},t h e r e b y
contradicting 1(a). We must conclude that 

Â()={},a sd e s i r e d .
Suﬃcient Condition for Subcase 2: Assuming that conditions 2(a) and (b) are true,
we need to prove that 

Â()={}.I f  ∈ 

Â(),f o rs o m e ∈  \{ },t h e n
the necessary condition for subcases 1 and 2 implies that  ∈ 

Â( \{ }),f o rs o m e
 ∈ , thereby contradicting 2(a). If 

Â()={}, then 1(b) and 2(a) imply that


Â( \{ })={},f o rs o m e ∈  \{ }. On the other hand, 1(a) implies that
 ∈ 

Â( \{ 0}), for all 0 ∈  \{ }, and this leads to a contradiction with condition
2(b). A similar reasoning shows that 

Â() 6= {}, and hence 

Â()={}, as desired.
¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a2
Lemma 5 Let  be a bargaining solution that satisﬁes EFF, NBC, and EC. Then
|()| ≤ 2,f o ra l l ⊆ .
Proof: Suppose that one can ﬁnd three elements  in (),f o rs o m e ⊆ .
EFF implies that the choice out of any pair in {} is the pait itself, and EC implies
that a single element must be chosen out of the triplet. This contradicts NBC. ¥
Lemma 6 Let  be a bargaining solution that satisﬁes SYM, RA, PC, EFF, ATT, NBC,
and EC. Let  be four distinct elements of .I f ({})={},t h e n
({})={}.
41Proof: RA implies that  ∈ ({}). Lemma 5 implies that we will be done af-
ter proving that ({}) is not equal to {},n o r{}.S i n c e t h e a r g u m e n t
is similar in both cases, we will only show how to rule out the ﬁrst one. Suppose
on the contrary that ({})={}. EFF implies that ({})={},
({}) 6= {},a n d({}) 6= {}. EC implies that it is impossible to have
({})={} and ({})={}.A T Ta l s oi m p l i e st h a ti ti si m p o s s i b l et oh a v e
({})={} and ({})={},o r({})={} and ({})={}.
Hence ({})={} and ({})={}.A l s o , ({})={} implies
that ({})={}, ({}) 6= {},a n d({}) 6= {},b yE F F .N o t i c et h a t
({}) must be a singleton, because of EC if ({})={}, and because of
ATT if ({})={}. RA implies that ({})={}.I f({})={},t h e n
({})={}, by ATT, and we get a contradiction with SYM. If ({})=
{}, then it must be that ({})={} to avoid a contradiction with PC. ATT
thus implies that ({})={}, which contradicts RA. Hence the original hypoth-
esis that ({})={} is false, and we are done with the proof. ¥
Lemma 7 Let  be a bargaining solution that satisﬁes SYM, RA, PC, EFF, ATT, NBC,
EC, and EXP, and let  be four distinct elements of  such that the choice out
of any pair is the pair itself. Then the three following statements are true:
1. If ({})={} and ({})={},t h e n({})={}.
2. It is impossible to have ({})={}, ({})={},a n d({})=
{}.
3. If ({})={} and ({})={},t h e n({})={}.
Proof:F o rt h eﬁrst statement, assume that ({})={} and ({})=
{}.R A i m p l i e s t h a t ({}) cannot be  nor  since  ∈ {} and
({})={}, and cannot be ,n o r,s i n c e ∈ {} and ({})={}.
Lemma 5 implies that ({}) must contain two elements. RA rules out {},
{}, {}, {},a n d{}. Hence it must be {}. Applying Lemma 6, we
conclude that ({})={}, as desired.
For the second statement, assume that ({})={}, ({})={},a n d
({})={}.I t i s n o t d i ﬃcult to check that RA and Lemma 5 imply that
({}) must equal {} or {}. The former case leads to a contradiction with
EXP, while the other leads to a contradiction with SYM.
42For the third statement, assume that ({})={} and ({})={}.E C
implies that ({}) must be a singleton. Suppose that ({})={}. Thanks
to the ﬁr s ts t a t e m e n t ,w ec a nc o m b i n et h i sw i t h({})={}, to conclude that
({})={}. Hence a contradiction with the second statement ( is “in between”
both  and ,a n d and , while  is “in between”  and ). If ({})={},t h e n
one gets again a contradiction with the second statement ( is “in between” both  and
,a n d and , while  is “in between”  and ). ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 : W ew a n tt op r o v et h a t ,f o re a c hs e t ⊆  with at least two el-
ements and such that the choice out of any pair in  is the pair itself, there exist exactly
two elements in  that are not chosen out of any triplet in  . This is done by induction
o nt h en u m b e ro fe l e m e n t si n . The result is trivial if # =2or 3.L e t be a positive
i n t e g e rl a r g e ro re q u a lt o3, and suppose that the result holds for all set with no more
than  elements. Consider now a set  with  +1elements.
F i r s tn o t i c et h a tt h e r ec a n n o tb em o r et h a nt w oe l e m e n t si n that are not chosen
out of any triplet, since the choice out of any triplet in  is a singleton, by EC. Since 
has more than three elements, we can choose 0 ∈  such that ({0})={}.
Let 
0 be the two elements in  \{ } that are not chosen out of any triplet in  \{ }
(using the induction hypothesis). We will be done with the proof after showing that
these two elements are not chosen out of any triplet in  . This amounts to show that
({}) 6= {}, for all  ∈  \{ },a n d({
0}) 6= {
0}, for all  ∈  \{ 
0}
(since we already know that  and 
0 are not chosen out of any triplet in  \{ }).
We prove the ﬁrst statement only, the argument with 
0 instead of  being similar. We
proceed by considering three cases.
Case 1: {0} = {
0}. In that case, we know that ({
0})={}.S u p p o s et o
the contrary of what we want to prove that ({})={},f o rs o m e ∈  \{ }.
It must be that  6= 
0, and hence ({
0})={},b yd e ﬁnition of 
0.O nt h eo t h e r
hand, the ﬁrst statement of Lemma 7 implies that ({
0})={}, hence the desired
contradiction.
Case 2: {0} ∩ {
0} 6= ∅, but {0} 6= {
0}. Suppose for instance that  = 
(the argument for the three other cases  = 
0, 0 = 
0,a n d0 =  is similar). We know
that ({0})={} and ({0
0})={0} (by deﬁnition of 
0). Suppose to
the contrary of what we want to prove that ({})={},f o rs o m e ∈  \{ }.
Observe that ({0
0}) cannot be {} because of the second statement of Lemma
7, and it cannot be {
0} t oa v o i dac o n t r a d i c t i o nw i t ht h eﬁrst statement of Lemma 7.
43EC implies that ({0
0})={}.T h eﬁrst statement of Lemma 7 now implies that
({
0}) cannot be {} nor {
0}, i.e. ({
0})={}. Hence we can assume that
 is diﬀerent from 
0,a n dw ek n o wt h a t({
0})={},b yd e ﬁnition of 
0.T h i s
leads to a contradiction with the ﬁrst statement of Lemma 7, since ({})={}.
Case 3: {0} ∩ {
0} = ∅. Suppose to the contrary of what we want to prove
that ({})={},f o rs o m e ∈  \{ }.I f({0})={},t h e nw er e a c ha
contradiction with ({
0})={} and ({0
0})={0},v i at h eﬁrst statement
of Lemma 7. Hence ({0})={} or {0}. We consider only the ﬁrst case, the
argument for the second case being similar. The third statement of Lemma 7 implies
({})={},s i n c e({0})={}.H e n c e ({
0}) 6= {}, as otherwise
one would get a contradiction with the second statement of Lemma 7 (with  being “in
between” both  and ,a n d and 
0, while  is “in between”  and 
0). So  = 
0 is
impossible. If  6= 
0,t h e n({
0})={}. Once combined with ({})={},
the ﬁrst statement of Lemma 7 implies that ({
0})={}, a contradiction again. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a3
Let 0 ∈  such that ({0})={},a n dl e t ∈ . We will be done with the
ﬁrst part of the statement after proving that either ({})={} or ({0})=
{} (meaning that one can actually choose  in {0}). Notice ﬁrst that ({})
must be a singleton, by EC if ({})={},o rb yA T Ti f({}) is a singleton.
A similar argument implies that ({0}) is a singleton as well. Suppose now, on the
contrary to what we want to prove, that ({}) ∈ {} and ({0}) ∈ {0}.
Notice that we must have ({})=({0}), as otherwise we would have a
contradiction with Lemma 5 and RA (there is no way to select at most two elements out of
{0}, that lead to a nonempty intersection with three diﬀerent singleton choices in
t h r e es u b s e t so fc a r d i n a l i t y3) .H e n c ei tm u s tb et h a tb o t h({}) and ({0})
equal {}.I t i s n o t d i ﬃcult to check that this, combined ({0})={},i m p l i e s
that ({0})={} or {}, again as a consequence of Lemma 5 and RA. SYM
makes the second case impossible. Indeed,  does not belong to neither ({}),
nor ({0}). So we are forced to conclude that ({0})={},b u tt h e nw e
get a contradiction with EXP since 0 ∈ . We are thus done with the proof of the
ﬁrst part of the statement.
As for the second part, let 0 ∈  besuchthat({})={} and ({0})=
{}. S u p p o s e ,t ot h ec o n t r a r yo fw h a tw ew a n tt op r o v e ,t h a t Â1  and 0 Â1 .
Notice that ({})={},a so t h e r w i s e({})={} or {}, by ATT. Sim-
44ilarly, ({0})={0}. Hence  Â2  and  Â2 0. By the induction hypoth-
esis, ({0})=

Â({0}). Hence ({0})={}. Combining this with
({})={} and ({0})={}, Lemma 5 and RA imply that ({0})=
{} or {}. The second case would lead to a contradiction with SYM, and hence
({0})={}, but this leads to a contradiction with EXP, since ({})=
{}, ({})={}, ({0})={0},a n d({0})={0}.W e a r e t h u s
done with the proof of the second and last part of the statement. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a4
Lemma 8 Let  be a bargaining solution that satisﬁe sS Y M ,R A ,E F F ,N B C ,E C ,a n d
EXP. Suppose that the choice out of any pair in {0} is the pair itself, and that
({0})={}.I f ∈  and 0 ∈ ,t h e n({0})={}.
Proof:A T Ti m p l i e st h a t({})=({0})={}.S i n c e ({0})=
{}, it follows from Lemma 5, RA and SYM that ({0})={}.E C i m p l i e s
that ({0}) is a singleton. If ({0})={}, then we get a contradiction with
EXP, since ({})={}. By a similar argument, ({0}) 6= {0}, and hence
({0})={}. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 : Assume, by contradiction, that there exist 
0 ∈  and 0 ∈ 
such that  Â2  and 0 Â1 
0. Hence ({}) 6= {},b yd e ﬁnition of Â on .A l s o ,
({}) 6= {}, as otherwise we would get a contradiction with  ∈  via PC, since
 ∈ .H e n c e({})={}. A similar argument implies that ({
00})={
0 0}.
By deﬁnition of Â on ,w eh a v e :
 Â1  Â2 
0 Â1 
0 
0 Â2 0 (2)
The proof proceeds by considering two cases.
Case 1 ({0})={} and ({
0})={
0}
By deﬁnition of Â,w eh a v e :  Â 0 and 
0 Â . Combining this with (2), it fol-
lows that  Â1 0 Â1 
0 Â1  and 
0 Â2  Â2  Â2 0.S i n c e  = 

Â on triplets
in ,w ec o n c l u d et h a t({0})={} and ({
00})={
0}. ATT implies that
({})=({0})=,a n d({
0})=({
00})=
0.S Y M ,L e m m a5 ,
45and RA imply that ({0})={} and ({
00})={
0}.T h i sl e a d st oac o n -
tradiction with EXP if ({0})={} or {0},s i n c e0 ∈ , ({0})={0},
({})={},a n d({
0})={
0}. EC implies that ({0}) is a singleton,
and hence ({0})={}, but this contradicts the assumption of Lemma 4. Hence
this ﬁrst case is impossible, and we have to look into the second case.
Case 2 ({0}) 6= {} and/or ({
0}) 6= {
0}.
We consider the case where ({0}) 6= {}. A similar reasoning applies if ({
0}) 6=
{
0}. ({0})={0} would lead to a contradiction with 0 ∈  via PC, since  ∈ .
Hence ({0})={0}.I f  Â1 0,t h e n Â1 0 Â1 
0 and 
0 Â2 0 Â2 ,b y( 2 )
and the fact that  = 

Â on pairs in .A l s o ,  = 

Â on triplets in , and hence
({
0 0})={0}. On the other hand, ATT implies that ({0})={} and
({
0 0})={
0}.T h e r ei sn ow a yo fd e ﬁning ({
0 0}) so as to satisfy Lemma
5 and RA. Hence it must be that 0 Â1 . In turn, this implies that 0 Â1  Â1  and
 Â2  Â2 0, by (2) and the fact that  = 

Â on pairs in .A l s o , = 

Â on triplets in
, and hence ({0})={}. Lemma 8 implies ({0})={}, a contradiction
with the assumption of Lemma 4. Case 2 is thus impossible as well. ¥
Â∗
1 and Â∗
2 are transitive
Transitivity is the subject of Lemmas 10 and 11. Before stating and proving them,
we need to establish a useful property.
Lemma 9 Let  be a bargaining solution that satisﬁe sS Y M ,R A ,E F F ,A T T ,N B C ,
EC, and EXP. Let 0 be four elements of  such that the solution out of any
pair in {} is the pair itself, ({0})={0},a n d({0})={0}.T h e n
({})={} if and only if ({0})={}.
Proof:N o t i c e t h a t ({0}) 6= {}, as otherwise we would get a contradiction
with ({})={} via PC, since ({0})={0}. Independently of whether
({0})={0} or {0}, ATT implies that ({0})=({0})={0}.
If ({})={}, then Lemma 5 and RA imply that ({0})={0} or
{0}. The former case leads to a contradiction with EXP. In the latter case, SYM
implies that 0 6∈ ({0}),s i n c e({0})={0}. ({0})={0} would imply
({0})={0}, by ATT, a contradiction. Hence ({0})={0}, and EC implies
that ({0}) must be a singleton, or ({0})={} given RA, as desired.
46If ({0})={}, then Lemma 5 and RA imply that ({0})={0}.
Lemma 6 implies in turn that ({})={}, as desired. ¥
Lemma 10 Let (Â1Â2) be two complete, transitive and anti-reﬂexive orderings deﬁned
over  ⊆  such that  = 

Â on pairs and triplets in ,l e t ∈  \ ,l e t(Â∗
1Â∗
2) be
the extensions of (Â1Â2),a sd e ﬁned in the main text, let  be two elements of ,a n d
let  ∈ {12}.I f Â  and  Â∗
 ,t h e n Â∗
 . Similarly, if  Â∗
  and  Â ,t h e n
 Â∗
 .
Proof: The second statement being symmetric to the ﬁrst, its proof is very similar
and is therefore omitted. We are thus assuming that  Â  and  Â∗
 ,a n dw ew a n tt o
prove that  Â∗
 .I f ∈ , then we are done. So we’ll assume  ∈ .
Suppose that there is no 0 ∈  such that ({0})={}.I f ∈ ,t h e n
 Â∗
 ,b yd e ﬁnition of Â∗
. Suppose now that  ∈ . Our construction of Â∗ is such
that either  Â∗
  for all  ∈ ,o r Â∗
  for all  ∈ .H e n c e Â∗
 , as desired.
So from now on we assume that there exist 0 ∈  such that ({0})={}.
By Lemma 3, there exists 0 ∈  such that ({0})={}.I f  Â 0,t h e n
 Â∗
 , by construction, and we are done. So we prove in the remainder that 0 Â  is
impossible. So we will assume, on the contrary, that 0 Â  and  Â− 0.
Suppose ﬁrst that  ∈ . In that case, ({}) is diﬀerent from {}, as otherwise
we get a contradiction with  ∈  via PC. ({}) is also diﬀerent from {},s i n c e
 Â ,a n d = 

Â on all pairs in . Hence ({})={}.S i n c e = 

Â on all pairs
in ,w ec o n c l u d e Â− .G i v e nt h a t0 Â  and  Â− 0, the transitivity of Â implies
that 0 Â  and  Â− 0.S i n c e = 

Â on all pairs in , ({0})={0}.G i v e n
that  ∈ ,A T Tn o wi m p l i e st h a t({})=({0})={}.S i n c e = 

Â
on all triplets in , it follows that ({0})={}. But because ({0})={},
t h e r ei sn ow a yt od e ﬁne ({0}) so as to satisfy RA, given Lemma 5, and we get
the desired contradiction.
Suppose next that  ∈ . Then, it follows from  Â∗
  that  Â∗
− ,b yc o n -
struction. If ({0})={0},t h e n0 Â , by construction, and hence  Â  (by
assumption for  and by transitivity for −). Since  = 

Â on pairs in ,w ec o n c l u d e
that ({})={}. ATT implies that ({})={} and ({0})={0}.
It becomes impossible to deﬁne ({0}) so as to satisfy RA and Lemma 5, given
that ({0})={}. S ow em u s tc o n c l u d et h a t({0}) 6= {0}, and hence
({0})={0} since 0 Â  (this follows from our assumptions that  Â  and
0 Â , and from the transitivity of Â). If ({})={}, then Lemma 9 implies that
47({0})={}, and we get a contradiction with  Â∗
 ,s i n c e0 Â  (see Lemma
3). As in the previous paragraph, we cannot have ({})={} either, because  Â .
Hence ({})={}.S o0 Â  Â  and  Â−  Â− 0,a n d({0})={}
since  = 

Â on triplets in . In addition, we also know that ({0})={}.S i n c e
0 ∈  and ({0})={0},t h e n({0}) must be a singleton, by EC. If
({0}) ∈ {0}, then there is no way of deﬁning ({0}) so as to satisfy
Lemma 5 and RA. Hence, ({0})={}, and we get a contradiction with  Â∗
 ,
since 0 Â  (see Lemma 3). ¥
Lemma 11 Let (Â1Â2) be two complete, transitive and anti-reﬂexive orderings deﬁned
over  ⊆  such that  = 

Â on pairs and triplets in ,l e t ∈  \ ,l e t(Â∗
1Â∗
2) be
the extensions of (Â1Â2),a sd e ﬁned in the main text, let  be two elements of ,a n d
let  ∈ {12}.I f Â∗
  and  Â∗
 ,t h e n Â .
Proof: We wish to show that  Â .I f({})={}, then we are done. Assume
({}) 6= {}.
We ﬁrst consider the case where  ∈ . Hence ({}) 6= {},o r({})=
{}, since otherwise we get a contradiction with  Â∗
  via PC. Now assume that the
conclusion of the lemma is wrong, i.e.  Â . N o t i c et h a tt h e r em u s te x i s t0 ∈ 
such that ({0})={},a so t h e r w i s e Â∗
 ,b yd e ﬁnition of Â∗, a contradiction.
Since  Â∗
 ,i tm u s tb et h a t0 Â  and  Â− 0,a g a i nb yd e ﬁnition of Â∗.S i n c e
 Â ,  Â− ,a n d = 

Â on triplets in , it follows that ({0})={}.G i v e n
that  is added after  in our induction, it cannot be that ({})={}.S i n c e
 Â∗
 ,i tc a n n o tb et h a t({})={} either. Hence  ∈ .A T T i m p l i e s t h a t
({})={}, but then there is no way of deﬁning ({0}) so as to satisfy
Lemma 5 and RA. We, therefore, conclude that  Â , as desired.
Consider next the case where  ∈ . As in the previous paragraph,  ∈ .B y
our construction of Â∗, there must exist 0 0 ∈  such that ({0})={} and
({0})={}.I ft h i sw a sn o tt r u e ,t h e n would be ranked above or below both
 and  according to Â∗
, thereby contradicting our assumption that  Â∗
  and  Â∗
 .
Suppose that ({})={}. Lemma 9 implies that ({0})={}.S i n c e
 Â∗
 ,w em u s th a v e0 Â .W em u s ta l s oh a v e Â 0,s i n c e({0})={} and
 Â∗
 . Transitivity of Â implies that  Â ,a sd e s i r e d .
Suppose now that ({})={},a n dt h a t Â ,c o n t r a r i l yt ow h a tw ew a n t
to prove. Then 0 Â  Â  Â 0 and 0 Â−  Â−  Â− 0 in order to have  Â∗
 
and  Â∗
 . The solution out of any pair in {} is the pair itself. So ({})
48is a singleton, by EC. It cannot be ,a st h i sw o u l di m p l y Â∗
 . Suppose that
({})={}.S i n c e ({0} = {},t h eﬁrst statement of Lemma 7 implies
that (0)={}, hence a contradiction with  Â∗
 ,s i n c e0 Â . Suppose now
that ({})={}.S i n c e ({0} = {},t h eﬁrst statement of Lemma 7
implies that ({0})={}, hence a contradiction with  Â∗
 ,s i n c e Â 0. ¥
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